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SEX SELECTION: REGULATING TECHNOLOGY




As technology allowing preselection of a child's gender has improved,
observers have debated whether such practices should be prohibited.
With sex selection, as with many issues of emotional appeal, political
positions have antedated careful reflection, and legislative initiatives have
marched well in advance of strategic planning. As a result, groups at
either extreme of the issue have captured the critical thinking on the
subject.
The debate over the prohibition of sex (or gender) selection (also
known as "preselection" or "predetermination"), has focused almost
exclusively on the context of aborting a "wrong-sex" fetus after a fetal
gender-identification procedure. Despite the fact that sex selection
abortions represent only a small subset of sex selection procedures,
attitudes toward the former are driving general policy approaches to the
latter. However, the issues are analytically distinct, and only during the
former infancy of the pre-conceptive (and non-abortive post-conceptive)
technology for sex selection were members on both sides of the debate
afforded the economy of using one logic to support views on two issues.
Consequently, the subsequent dramatic advances in sperm separation and
artificial insemination technology challenge this unstable consolidation of
views and require the context-specific division of the emotional reactions,
analytic reasoning, and societal responses.
Divided by a line separating their resultant positions, commentators
have grouped themselves into prohibitionists and non-interventionists.
Yet a different division, along the perpendicular line separating them by
their methods of analysis, would yield two different groups: those for
* Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1985, Amherst College;
J.D., 1991, Yale Law School. The author gratefully acknowledgesthe invaluable comments
and criticisms of Susan D. Daggett, Andrew and Ellen Quinn, Mark T. Quinlivan, Simon
J. Frankel, and Eric Dodson Greenberg. The article also benefitted greatly from discussions
with Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, Patricia King Jackson, and Dr. Jay Katz, and from
the assistance of John Wicks and Pamela MeAlister. All were generous with time and
insight, and none necessarily share the author's views.
HeinOnline  -- 6 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1 1992-1993
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
whom sex selection is either fundamentally wrong or non-prohibitable
(herein referred to as "absolutists"), on the one hand, and those for
whom the consequences of sex selection or its prohibition dictate a
normative position (herein referred to as "consequentialists"), on the
other. The first division encourages combat, while the second suggests
that consequentialists, at least, have room to negotiate the accommodation
of their respective concerns.
Existing legal literature on sex selection has been principally limited
to the abortion context' and argues simply either in favor of prohibitiori
or against it.' To date, no significant efforts have been made to address
the broader issue of the appropriate governmental approach, if any, to sex
selection in general. This Article attempts to do so.
The way governments conceptualize and address sex selection will have
serious implications for the future, regardless of the actual incidence of
sex selection. Irrespective of one's politics, for example, prohibitory
legislation clearly alters the legal landscape, serving as collateral
precedent for additional governmental intrusion into whatever reproduc-
tive liberties remain.
Consequently, Part I of this Article explains why legislators and policy-
makers need to address sex selection now. It highlights accelerating
technological advances, dramatic gender preferences that endure, and
increasing willingness to supply and to use sex selection techniques. It
also notes how the sharply polarized views on the subject may yield ill-
considered legislation. Part II explores some reasons why people may
want to use sex selection technology, along with arguments for, and
against, allowing them to do so.
Part III examines why sex selection is such a uniquely difficult and
divisive issue for feminist groups and considers the prominent policy
approaches: non-intervention and prohibition. Part IV then exposes the
limitations of these approaches by identifying separate and discernable
1. But see George Schedler, Benign Sex Discrimination Revisited: Constitutional and
Moral Issues in Banning Sex-Selection Abortion, 15 PEPP. L. REv. 295 (1988) (the last
sentence positing that the prohibitions therein proposed may be appropriate for future
"home" sex-selection techniques).
2. See John R. Shaibley, Sex Selection Abortion:A Constitutional Analysis ofthe Abortion
Liberty and a Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 281 (1981); Schedler, supra note 2, at
295. See generally Richard Delgado & Judith D. Keyes, Parental Preferences and Selective
Abortion: A Commentary on Roe v. Wade, Doe v. Bolton, and the Shape of Things to Come,
1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 203 (1974).
3. See, e.g., MARY ANNEWARREN, GENDERCIDE:THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEX SELECTION
(1985).
[Vol. 6
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categories of arguments proposed to justify them. Realigning these
categories graphically isolates anti-abortion arguments that do not reach
preconceptive technologies, and reveals significant methodological
similarities between many of the remaining viewpoints previously thought
disconnected and irreconcilable. Part V then makes a case for regulating
sex selection, provides an action plan for doing so, and explores, for
heuristic purposes, one possible example of such regulation.
The complexity of an issue such as sex selection, invoking both
emotional responses and rational concerns, suggests that any effort to
refine discussions is susceptible to misinterpretation of motive. So that
it may be clear: This Article takes no moral position on sex selection.
While it is certainly possible and important to consider the issue from
perspectives ranging from moral or religious to social or sociobiological,
this Article explores the range of legal approaches, if any, that are and
are not appropriate.
I. SEX SELECTION IN CONTEXT
This Part explores the five reasons why sex preselection is worth
serious attention. First, the enabling technology, which has already been
employed for a number of years, has advanced at a rapid pace. Second,
studies of the prevalence of gender preferences suggest an enormous
market for the technology. Third, recent years have shown a dramatic
increase in the acceptability to the public and to practitioners of using the
technology. Fourth, people are already taking sides, without evidence of
proper reflection. Fifth, and consequently, legislatures are taking action,
without benefit of a thoughtful and complete discussion of all the options
available.
A. Myth to Mechanism: The Evolution of Sex Selection Technology
Understanding the role of sex selection in society today requires
knowledge of the long and rich history behind the development of the
technology and the sophisticated techniques now available. As centuries
passed, the unrelenting effort to control the sex of offspring, and the
sometimes bizarre techniques employed, manifested a basic urge that
spanned cultures and continents.
The earliest postconceptive method of sex selection, not surprisingly,
was infanticide. Although the earliest records suggesting infanticide are
Fall, 1992]
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from the Tokugawa period in Japan (1600 to 1868 C.E.), with nine times
as many male births as female births recorded,4 it is widely believed that
the practice had already existed for thousands of years.' Perhaps more
common, and certainly more humane, were early efforts to affect the
gender of a child prior to conception. These efforts, as diverse as gender
preferences are strong, might be loosely grouped as the "biologic" and
the "symbolic." Biologic methods concerned behavior during copulation,
the timing of copulation, and the diet of the female. Symbolic methods,
in contrast, were mystical.
1. Early Biologic Methods
Aristotle taught the most rudimentary (and perhaps most self-serving)
biologic method: The ikelihood of having a male correlated directly to
the vigor with which one copulated.6 Although there are, no doubt,
some remaining disciples of this theory, it was largely unsuccessful in
supplanting the more intellectually appealing theory of "sidedness." Men
have two testicles, women two ovaries, and humans two genders.
Consequently it seemed logical that gender correlated to the "side" of the
body involved in human reproduction. Thus, women were instructed to
lie on this side or that during intercourse.7 Less pleasantly, the Greek
philosopher Anaxagoras (500 to 428 B.C.E.) thought that males were
born of sperm from the right testicle, and suggested tying off the left one
just prior to copulation.
The left/right theory persisted for millennia. French noblemen, for
example, were still advised, more than 2200 years later, that removal of
the left testicle guaranteed male heirs.' And Hindu Tantric texts (7th to
17th century C.E.) taught a variation of this left/right theory, declaring
that if at the moment of orgasm the "solar breath," taken via the right
4. See Paul W. Zarutskie et al., The Clinical Relevance of Sex Selection Techniques, 52
FERTILITY & STERILITY 891 (1989); see also Austin L. Hughes, Female Infanticide: Sex
Ratio Manipulation in Humans, 2 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 109 (1981).
5. For discussion of more modem infanticide among Tahitians, Formosans, Indians, and
North Africans, see LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHTS 34 (1976).
6. DAVID M. RORVIK & LANDRUM B. SHETTLES, CHOOSE YOUR BABY'S SEX: THE ONE
SEX SELECTION METHOD THAT WORKS 27 (1976) [hereinafter RORVICK & SHETTLES,
CHOOSE YOUR BABY'S SEX]; see also DAVID M. RORVIK & LANDRUM B. SHETTLES, YOUR
BABY'S SEX: Now You CAN CHOOSE (1970).
7. RORVICK & SHETTLES, CHOOSE YOUR BABY'S SEX, supra note 6, at 27.
8. Ronald J. Levin, Human Sex Pre-Selection, 9 OXFORD REV. REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY
161, 162 (1987).
[Vol. 6
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nostril, dominates in man and the "lunar breath," taken via the left
nostril, dominates in woman, and conception occurs, the child will be
male. The opposite formula supposedly yields females. 9  Certain
Talmudic scholars believe the Bible, too, offers a biologic method of sex
preselection: the timing of orgasm. Interpreting Leviticus,"0 Rabbi
Isaac states in the Babylonian Talmud that if a woman "emits her semen"
first she bears a male child; if the man "emits his semen" first she bears
a female child." Interpreting these words as a reference to orgasm, and
attentive to all possibilities, the Talmud opines that if both man and
woman "emit semen" simultaneously, a single offspring would be
hermaphroditic, and twins would be one of each. 2
Supporters of early dietetic theories attempted to capitalize on the role
nutrition may play in influencing gender. In the middle ages, for
example, a woman seeking to bear a boy was advised to drink a
concoction of wine and lion's blood (in proper proportions) and then
copulate under a full moon while an abbot prayed for a boy (presumably
from a safe distance). 3 Later dietetic theories suggested eating various
combinations of fish, seeds, sugars, peas, lettuce, cheese, salt, sweets,
and even the testes of certain animals. 4
2. Early Symbolic Methods
Symbolic methods for preselecting sex have involved, for example,
making sure to hang one's trousers on the appropriate bedpost (Pennsyl-
vania) and keeping poppies or sugar on the windowsill for a boy or girl,
respectively (Czechoslovakia and Hungary)."5 Others have taught that,
9. Id. at 162-63. Hindus consider the sun the masculine, fiery energy, while the moon
is considered the feminine, cooling energy.
10. See Leviticus 12:2.
11. Fred Rosner, The Biblical and Talmudic Secret for Choosing One's Baby's Sex, 15
ISR. J. MED. Sci. 784 (1979). Some have conjectured that this concept is functionally
derived, encouraging men to practice restraint during intercourse by holding out the promise
of male issue as reward. Id. at 787.
12. Id. at 785.
13. RORVIK & SHETTLES, CHOOSE YOUR BABY'S SEX, supra note 6, at 24.
14. SALLY LANGENDOEN & WILLIAM PROCTOR, THE PRECONCEPTION GENDER DIET:
DIET A = BOY, DIET B = GIRL 18-19 (1982); RORVIK & SHETTLES, CHOOSE YOUR
BABY'S SEX, supra note 6, at 24; ROBERT H. GLASS & RONALD J. ERICSSON, GETTING
PREGNANT IN THE 1980s: NEw ADVANCES IN INFERTILITY TREATMENT AND SEX
PRESELECTION 114 (1982).
15. RORVIK & SHETTLES, CHOOSE YOUR BABY'S SEX, supra note 6 at 30; LANOENDOEN
& PROCTER, supra note 14, at 18-19; GLASS & ERICSSON, supra note 14, at 114.
Fall, 1992]
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to conceive a male: women should dress like a man before intercourse
(Palau Islands); a man should take an axe to bed with a woman while
singing a prescribed song (Spessart Mountains of Germany); a young boy
should be present in bed during intercourse (Yugoslavia); and the man
should bite the woman's right ear before his orgasm (Italian Province of
Modena). 16 There are even reports that raping one's wife was recom-
mended, as one of the various "superiority" theories that taught that the




Despite millennia of theorizing on the biological method of sex
determination, and the implementation of more than five hundred theories
worldwide," it was not until 1924 that researchers confirmed the
existence of sex chromosomes. 9 They learned that the sole factor
determining the gender of an embryo is whether an X- or a Y-bearing
sperm fertilized the already X-bearing egg. (Fertilization by a Y-bearing
sperm results in a male, and by an X-bearing sperm, a female.)') Yet
understanding the rudiments of biological sex determination and establish-
ing a useful technology for sex predetermination proved to be different
matters altogether.
Researchers early in this century scrutinized human existence for
factors that might skew the gender ratio,2 and postconceptive and
preconceptive technologies evolved side by side.
16. See generally RORVIK & SHErLES, CHOOSE YOUR BABY'S SEX, supra note 6, at 24-
30.
17. See ELIZABETH M. WHELAN, BOY OR GIRL?: THE SEX SELECTION TECHNIQUE THAT
MAKES ALL OTHERS OBSOLETE 34 (1977). Other unusual theories prevalent at this time
concerned the relative ages and weights of parents, variations in their temperament,
complexion, and features, and even the use of pseudo-hypnotic suggestions to passive and
reclining women. Id. at 32-37.
18. Levin, supra note 8, at 163.
19. See Theophilus S. Painter, The Sex Chromosomes of Man, 58 AM. NAT. 506 (1924).
20. Humans typically have 46 chromosomes. Human eggs and human sperm,
predictably, each have 23. Each egg bears an X chromosome, while each sperm bears
either an X or a Y chromosome. An egg fertilized by an X-bearing sperm produces a
female (XX), while an egg fertilized by a Y-bearing sperm produces a male (XY).
21. See Levin, supra note 8, at 166. Such factors included birth order, sex of the first-
born child, age of the respective parents, frequency of intercourse, occupation, weather,
illegitimacy, and even local geography. Id.
[Vol. 6
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a. Postconceptive Techniques
Postconceptive gender selection can be performed in vivo (in the body)
or in vitro (out of the body). Current in vivo posteonceptive methods of
sex selection involve learning the gender of a developing embryo or fetus,
followed by abortion if it is of the "wrong" sex. There are basically
three techniques for learning gender: ultrasound, chorionic villi
sampling, and amniocentesis.'
Using the non-invasive ultrasound technique, a doctor directs a high-
frequency sound source at the fetus. The echoes vary with the density of
fetal morphology and are processed to generate a visual image of the fetus
in utero. Looking for genital development, a doctor can detect sex fairly
reliably nine weeks after conception. In chorionic villi sampling, a doctor
inserts a suction tube transcervically or transabdominally during the first
trimester of pregnancy and aspirates sloughed-off fetal cells. The cell
DNA are then analyzed for indication of gender.
Amniocentesis uses similar analysis, but the doctor collects the cells
through a hollow needle that is inserted through the mother's abdominal
wall. After subsequently passing through the uterine wall, the needle
enables the doctor to draw a small portion of the amniotic fluid surround-
ing the fetus. Cells floating in this liquid are either analyzed directly or
cultured for four to five weeks prior to study. This method is the most
prevalent internationally.
The postconception in vitro method selects by gender one of several
eggs fertilized in a laboratory and implants it in the mother. British
fertilization specialists improved the technique measurably when, in 1990,
they developed a procedure enabling the identification of the sex of a
human embryo when it is only eight cells old, that is, a mere three days
after conception.'
22. A fourth method, which detects fetal cells in the blood of a pregnant woman, is still
developing. See, e.g., Leonard A. Herzenberg et al., Fetal Cells in the Blood of Pregnant
Women: Detection and Enrichment by Fluorescence-Activated Cell Sorting, 76 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCi. 1453 (1979).
23. Teri Randall, Gene Scene: Earlier, Eventually More Specific, Prenatal Genetic
Diagnosis in Realm of Possibility, 264 JAMA 3113, 3113-14 (1990); see also Larry
Thompson, Cell Test Before Implant Helps Ensure Healthy "Test-Tube" Baby, WASH. POST,
Apr. 27, 1992, at A3.
Fall, 1992]
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b. Preconceptive Techniques
Preconceptive techniques can also be categorized as in vivo or in vitro.
Preconceptive in vivo theories still prevalent today concern special diets,
coital timing, hormonal and immunologic manipulation, and manipulation
of cervical mucus acidity.' One prominent approach, for example,
emphasizes the manipulation of sodium, potassium, and magnesium ions
in a woman's body.'
Preconceptive in vitro theories typically involve the separation of X-
from Y-bearing sperm as much as possible, followed by artificial
insemination of the woman using the "enriched" semen, that is semen in
which the gender ratio has been skewed. Theories on what might
separate the sperm, however, considerably antedated a method for
evaluating the success of the various techniques. For obvious reasons,
mass impregnation followed by observation of the gender ratio at birth
was impractical. Yet in 1964, a researcher discovered that Y-bearing
sperm, stained with quinacrine mustard, fluoresce under ultraviolet
light.' Consequently, research in sperm-separation techniques in-
creased.
Researchers discovered in 1971 that the X-bearing (or gynecogenic)
sperm is three percent larger than the Y-bearing (or androgenic) sperm.
This difference was later attributed to a greater quantity of DNA in the
X-bearing sperm.27 Although the X-bearing sperm swims more slowly
24. But see JACQUES BIRCHEN, CHOOSING THE SEX OF YOUR CHILD BY BIORHYTHMS
(1986) (discussing biorhythms); ROBERT CHOY, THE NEW NATURAL ASTROLOGICAL WAY
TO BIRTH CONTROL (1976) (planetary positions); VICTOR B. DADA, CHOOSE THE SEX OF
YOUR BABY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH vii, ix (1983) (child will be the gender of the
parent who had the strongest sexual desire at the moment of conception). These works
present modem, but less-accepted, theories of in vivo sex predetermination.
25. Joseph Stolkowski & Jean Choukroun, Preconception Selection of Sexin Man, 17 ISR.
J. MED. SCI. 1061, 1065 (1981) (reporting 80% success in selecting a child of either
gender); see also Kathryn McWhinter, Children: The Gender Vendors, INDEPENDENT, Oct.
27, 1991, at 54. Existing preconceptive in vivo techniques are still considered highly
speculative, largely because of the myriad potentially significant variables involved and the
difficulty of amassing reliable data. Were a "home remedy" technique to prove more
successful, its regulation might raise liberty and privacy problems beyond the scope of this
Article.
26. Another sophisticated but less frequently used technique, flow cytometry, uses lasers
and computerized sensors to detect small differences in the amount of light refracted by
sperm, correlating to their total DNA content. Joel H. Batzofin, XY Spenn Separation for
Sex Selection, 14 UROLOGIC CLINICS N. AM. 609, 611 (1987).
27. See A.T. Sumner et al., Distinguishing Between X, Y, and YY-bearing Human
Spermatozoa by Fluorescence and DNA Content, 229 NEW NATURE BIOLOGY 231, 232
(1971); Shirley F. Hartley & Linda M. Pietraczyk, Preselecting the Sex of Offspring:
[Vol. 6
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than the Y-bearing, it can travel longer distances, and is more resistant
to the acidic environments that periodically prevail in the female genital
tract. These observations prompted techniques intended to separate sperm
on the basis of size or weight, and others intended to exploit the
differences in mobility.' The former techniques employ centrifugation
(in which heavier sperm move from the center toward the wall of a
rotating cylinder), sedimentation (in which heavier sperm sink further
through a thick liquid), and differential filtration (in which sperm pass
through a layer of cervical mucous, and then through a millipore
filter).29
The techniques differentiating sperm by mobility focus principally on
speed (although there is also a technique availing of differing swimming
pattems-). In the most successful of these techniques, developed by
Roland J. Ericsson, sperm is introduced to the top of a test tube
containing three increasingly thicker layers of the protein "albumin."
The faster-swimming Y-bearing sperm reach the bottom of the tube
sooner, on average, and from this Y-enriched fluid a woman desiring a
boy is inseminated. 3'
Clinicians report that this technique can yield a semen sample that is
90% Y-bearing, and that between 76% and 82% of the women who
conceive after insemination will bear males.32 The same technique is
Technologies, Attitudes, and Implications, 26 Soc. BIOLOGY 232, 233 (1979).
28. Some believe that sperm may also be separated by a difference in electrical charge.
In "counterstream convection galvanization" a weak galvanic current is passed through a
low-temperature, fluid medium of glycine and alanine, causing X- and Y-bearing sperm to
cluster around the cathode and anode respectively. The technique has thus far yielded
mixed results. See generally PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW
SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 151-52 (1985).
29. McWhinter, supra note 25, at 54; Levin, supra note 8, at 178.
30. In this "laminar flow" technique, sperm are separated by an apparatus creating a
cylindrical flow of fluid that exhibits velocities differing with distance from the center. See
Levin, supra note 8, at 177.
3 1. Ferdinand J. Beernink & Roland J. Ericsson, Male Sex Preselection Through Sperm
Isolation, 38 FERTILITY & STERILITY 493-95 (1982); Lynn Smith, For Many, Picking a
Child's Gender is a Fertile Field, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1990, at El.
32. See generally Beernink & Ericsson, supra note 31, at 493-95 (79%-82%); Stephen
L. Corson et al., Sex Selection by Sperm Separation and Insemination, 42 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 756, 759 (1984) (80%); ROLAND J. ERICSSON, GAMETRICS BuLLETIN (1984)
(76 %), cited in id.; W. Paul Dmowski et al., Use ofAlbumin Gradientsfor X and Y Sperm
Separation and Clinical Experience with Male Sex Preselection, 31 FERTILITY & STERILITY
52-57 (1979) (80%); Zarutskie et al., supra note 4, at 891 (73%); Jonathon Hewitt,
Preconceptional Sex Selection, 37 BRIT. J. Hosp. MED. 149 (1987). All studies have been
somewhat limited by slight variations in technique, and by the relatively limited size of the
database. One study, for example, purports to dispute Ericsson's findings using only 48
procedure-assisted pregnancies, but itself calls for a larger study group to enable more
Fall, 1992]
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successful for selecting females only 67 % to 76 % of the time.33  An
alternate method for achieving X-enrichment, developed in 1975, filters
semen through a gelatinous material, Sephadex G50 fine.34  Initial
clinical studies using this technique have yielded 73 % females.
35
To put these results in perspective, increasing the likelihood of having
a boy from roughly 50% to roughly 75% could change the male/female
gender ratio at birth from roughly 1:1 to 3:1, if those employing the
technique consistently selected for boys. This abstract statistic would of
course be of little predictive value were it not for the fact that there is an
overwhelming preference for boys, both internationally and within the
United States.
B. Dominant Gender Preferences
The strength and prevalence of gender preferences suggests a ready-
made demand for the increasing supply and reliability of gender
preselection techniques.36
accurate assessment. Sharon B. Jaffe et al., A Controlled Study for Gender Selection, 56
FERTILITY & STERILITY 254, 257 (1991).
33. Barbara Altounyan & Leonie Jameson, Would you Make a Baby with the Sperm
Firm?, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 7, 1991, at 16 (67%-70%); Zarutskie et al., supra note 4, at
891. The natural male-to-female sex ratio at birth is approximately 105:100, although this
ratio reverses later in life, as women outlive men. Christina Ruegsegger Veit & Raphael
Jewelewicz, GenderPreselection: Facts and Myths, 49 FERTILITY & STERILITY 937 (1988).
Consequently, it is automatically slightly more likely to succeed in selecting for males than
females, a technological deficit that some would like to see eliminated. See, e.g., J.P.
Chaudhuri & W.B. Schill, A Possibility of Unbiased Sex Preselection in Humans by
Enrichment of X or Y Chromosome Bearing Spermatozoa, 19 ANDROLOGIA 157 (1987).
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory of the University of California has used a sperm-sorter that
identifies "female" sperm because they have 3 % more DNA. The technique has yielded
90% success, with either sex sought, in rabbits and pigs. However, their technique has not
yet been applied to humans. McWhinter, supra note 25, at 54.
34. See 0. Steeno et al., 7 ANDROLOGIA 95-99 (1975); see also Batzofin, supra note 26,
at 612-14.
35. Steven L. Corson et al., Preconceptual Female Gender Selection, 40 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 384, 385 (1983); see also Corson, supra note 32, at ":758. See generally
Zarutskie et al., supra note 4, at 891 (extensive compilation of studies, critiques, and
relative successes); Batzofin, supra note 26; James F. Daniell, Sex-Selection Procedures,
28 J. REPROD. MED. 235 (1983); Barbara Simeock, Sons and Daughters-A Sex Preselec-
tion Study, 142 MED. J. AUSTL. 541 (1985); Jonathan Schaffir, What are Little Boys Made
O]7 The Never-Ending Search for Sex Selection Techniques, 34 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED.
516 (1991); M. Ruth Nentwig, Technical Aspects of Sex Preselection, in THE CUSTOM-
MADE CHILD? VOMEN-CENTEREDPERSPECrIvEs 181 (Helen B. Holmes et al. eds., 1981).
36. Some of the reasons for gender preferences are discussed below in Part II.A.
[Vol. 6
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1. Preferences Internationally
Cultural factors, of course, strongly affect gender preferences. In
those cultures, for example, in which a daughter's parents are expected
to pay her groom a dowry, which frequently constitutes a year's salary,
parents are often less enthusiastic about bearing a girl.37 This prefer-
ence is particularly present in cultures where a male has far greater
earning opportunities and can substantially contribute to the family income
and welfare, both as a young man and as the caretaker ultimately
responsible for his parentsa
Because women have traditionally been regarded as less "valuable"
than men,3 9 some cultures have a skewed gender ratio even without
gender-selection technology. A 1991 United Nations report on global
census information, for example, identified quite a number of countries
in which the ratio is unexpectedly low. This was attributed, in part, to
variances in the extent of resources devoted to sick girls, as contrasted
with that afforded boys.' In India, for example, there are only about
ninety-three females for each one hundred males.4
A change in the ratio, in many countries, can also be attributed to the
37. See Stephen R. Weisman, No More Guarantees of a Son's Birth, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 1988, at Al, A9 (dowries in India). Although Indian legislation officially banned the
dowry system, it is still customary in certain societal strata. Saving the Daughters of India,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 27, 1988, at 13.
38. See, e.g., M. Ali Khan & Ismail Sirageldin, Son Preference and the Demand for
Additional Children in Pakistan, 14 DEMOGRAPHY 481-95 (1977).
39. In many cultures such gender preferences are unabashedly overt. This translation of
a song from Bulgaria, for example, bespeaks not only gender preferences but also violence
toward women who are not accommodating:
If the tenth too, is a girlchild
I will cut both of your feet off,
To the knees I'll cut your feet off,
Both your arms up to the shoulders,
Both your eyes too, I will put out ....
Letty C. Pogrebin, Bias Before Birth, in GROWING UP FREE: RAISING YOUR CHILD IN THE
80's 85 (1980). Note also, for example, the German proverb that "a house full of daughters
is like a cellar full of sour beer," and the Chinese proverb indicating that 18 goddess-like
daughters do not equal one deformed son. See WHELAN, supra note 17.
40. Madhu Kishwar, The Continuing Deficit of Women in India and the Impact of
Amniocentesis (food allocation), cited in GENA COREA, MAN-MADE WOMEN: How NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT WOMEN 30 (1987).
41. Nicholas D. Kristof, Stark Data on Women: 100 Million Are Missing, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1991, at Cl (reporting on the U.N. study, "The World's Women"); see also The
Grim Mystery of the World's Missing Women, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 3, 1992, at 25;
Kishwar, supra note 40.
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confluence of strong preferences and access to sex selection abortions.
One Chinese peasant was quoted as saying, "Ultrasound is really
worthwhile, even though my wife had to go through four abortions to get
a son." 42  And postconception sex selection clinics in India, for
example, have advertised that it is "better to spend 500 rupees now than
50,000 rupees later."'
In 1987, Bombay alone had 258 clinics offering amniocentesis. A
study of six hospitals by a local women's organization discovered that of
8000 abortions performed after amniocentesis 7999 were of female
fetuses.' This statistic does not necessarily mean that all amniocenteses
revealing female fetuses were followed by abortion. But it does suggest
that amniocentesis may frequently be used for sex selection.
2. Gender Preferences in the United States
While gender preferences abroad are well-known, it is surprising how
strong such preferences are in the United States. The results of studies
in the U.S., spanning over fifty years, reveal a continuing preference for
a male child as the only child, or, alternatively, as the first child.45 An
42. Kristof, supra note 41, at C12; cf. John Gittelsohn, It's a Bad Year for Baby Girls
in Korea; Births Likely to Drop, Abortions to Rise, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 16, 1990, at A2
(culture and gender preferences in Korea). See generally Lena H. Sun, Year of the Sheep,
Not the Kid, WASH. POST, May 13, 1991, at A20; Sheryl WuDunn, China's Castaway
Babies: Cruel Practice Lives On, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1991, at A4.
43. Weisman, supra note 37; see also Kishwar, supra note 40; Viola Roggencamp,
Abortion of a Special Kind: Male Sex Selection in India, in TEST TUBE WOMEN: WHAT
FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 266 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1989).
44. Teesta Setalvad, India: Daughters Have No Birth Right, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb.
24, 1987. See generally Neelkamal Pur, India: A Son is Born; Let the Daughters Hang,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 20, 1989; Lara Heise, The Global WarAgainst Women, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 1989, at BI; Abha Pandya, Prenatal Attack on Women, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 10, 1988, at 23; Edward A. Gargan, Ultrasound Skews India's Birth Ratio,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1991, at A13. The clinic/hospital combination is common because
sex determination tests were banned from government hospitals almost 20 years ago,
requiring sex selectors, as a practical measure, to visit an amniocentesis clinic separately.
Authorities established the ban after learning that, of 300 women requesting amniocentesis,
every one indicated a desire for an abortion if the fetus were female. Stuart Auerbach, Birth
Test Said to Help Indians Abort Females, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1982, at A24. A new law
in the western Indian state of Maharashtra, of which Bombay is the capital, now prohibits
prenatal tests to determine fetal sex. Steven R. Weisman, No More Guarantees of a Son's
Birth, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1988, at Al; Alan Dershowitz, Abortion Leads to 'Femicide,'
BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 23, 1988, at 29.
45. Hartley & Pietraczyk, supra note 27, at 232-46; see also Roberta Steinbacher,
Futuristic Implications of Sex Preselection, in THE CUSTOM-MADE CHILD? WOMEN-
CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 187 (Helen B. Holmes et al. eds., 1981); NANCY E. WILLIAM-
SON, SONS OR DAUGHTERS: A CROSS-CULTURAL SURVEY OF PARENTAL PREFERENCES 29-
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early study of U.S. natality statistics, for example, noted that the
male/female sex ratio of the last child, i.e., that after which a couple had
no more children, was 117.4 to 100. More families stopped having
children after a boy, therefore, than after a girl.' In the 1950s, 92%
of males and 66 % of females surveyed wanted a boy if limited to one
child." This pattern held in the 1960s, at 91% and 66% respectively,
as did the strong preference for boys as the firstborn,'8 held by nearly
80% of both sexes in the early 1970s.19
A recent study of United States women indicated that, were their
preferences actualized in a one-child-only context, they would birth 161
boys to every 100 girls.' Similarly, their preferences would result in
a ratio of 171 to 100 firstborn males to females in a multi-child con-
text." These results remained stable between 1970 and 1975,52 and
there is evidence that preference for sons is quite pronounced even among
many who are strong supporters of the women's movement.5 3
Attempts to quantify the potential effects of gender preferences have
67 (1976).
46. Sanford Winston, Birth Control and the Sex-Ratio at Birth, 38 AM. J. Soc. 225
(1932) (database of 5466 families completed).
47. See Roberta Steinbacher, Preselection of Sex, 20 SCIENCES 6, 28 (1980).
48. Simon R. Dinitz et al., Preferences for Male or Female Children: Traditional or
Affectional, 16 MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 128 (1964), cited in Ruegsegger Veit &
Jewelewicz, supra note 33, at 939 n.18; CHARLES F. WESTHOFF ET AL., FAMILY GROWTH
IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1961), cited in RuegseggerVeit & Jewelewicz, supra note 33,
at 939 n.17. See generally Ruegsegger Veit & Jewelewicz, supra note 33.
49. Gerald E. Markle & Charles B. Nam, Sex Predetermination: Its Impact On Fertility,
18 SoC. BIOLOGY 73 (1971). See generally Steinbacher, supra note 47.
50. Anne R. Pebley & Charles F. Westhoff, Women's Sex Preferences in the United
States: 1970 to 1975, 19 DEMOGRAPHY 177, 184 (1982).
51. Id. at 179. In one sampling of 363 women, more than 50% preferred a first-born
boy, while only 6% preferred a first-born girl. See Steinbacher, supra note 47.
Interestingly, women in the Philippines prefer a family with a balanced gender ratio.
William F. Stiner & Paul D. Mader, Sons, Daughters or Both: An Analysis of Family Sex
Composition Preferences in the Philippines, 12 DEMOGRAPHY 67 (1975).
52. Pebley & Westhoff, supra note 50. In one study of 1500 married women under 40,
twice as many women preferred boys to girls. It seems clear that one factor in this
preference is a desire to accommodate a stronger preference of the husband. Thus this same
survey reflected that among the reasons offered for son preference were desires: (1) to
please husbands, (2) to carry on the family name, and (3) to provide a companion for the
husband. Hoffman, Social Change, The Family and Sex Differences (1976), cited in John
C. Fletcher, Research Ethics, 128 PROGRESS IN CLINICAL & BIOLOGICAL RES. 333, 342
(1983).
53. Clyda S. Rent & George S. Rent, More on Offspring Sex-Preference: A Comment on
Nancy E. Williamson's "Sex Preference, Sex Control, and the Status of Women," 3 SIGNS:
J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc. 505 (1977); Faith Gilroy & Roberta Steinbacher,
Preselection of Child's Sex: Technological Utilization and Feminism 53 PSYCHOL. REP. 671
(1983).
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ranged from male/female ratios of approximately 110:1005 to as high
as 122:100 or even 140:100. 5- Yet there is little doubt that one cannot
accurately predict an actual gender ratio from a survey posing questions
in the abstract. Surveys cannot easily incorporate contextual complica-
tions (including personal and financial costs of sex selection), the relative
merits (including likelihood of success) of the technique to be used, and
the frequent disjunction between what a person wants and what a person
is willing to do to get it. Consequently, the mere existence of sex
preferences is insufficient to drive policy conclusions; it is not obvious
that every individual's sex preference will result in actual sex selection.
While preliminary clinical studies tend to confirm that some people
will be willing to actualize their preferences (a 1991 survey of couples
actually requesting sex-selection procedures, for example, revealed a
nearly 2:1 preference for boys 6), an examination of changing attitudes
toward both postconceptive and preconceptive technology will allow more
reliable insights into the likelihood that women will actually use sex-
selection technology.
C. Changing Attitudes Toward the Use of Sex Selection
A third reason why sex selection is worth immediate consideration is
that attitudes toward the supply and use of sex selection procedures have
become increasingly tolerant. Increased tolerance is not a problem in the
abstract, but it does suggest increased use, which in turn indicates a
potential exacerbation of any problems sex selection may generate. With
respect to postconceptive sex selection, for example, recent years have
seen a dramatic increase in the percentage of U.S. geneticists willing
either to perform prenatal diagnosis 7 as a precursor to a sex-selection
abortion unrelated to a gender-linked disease, or to refer a patient to
54. Amitai Etzioni, Sex Control, Science, and Society, 161 SCIENCE 1107, 1109 (1968).
55. See generally Steinbacher, supra note 47.
56. Sharon B. Jaffe et al., A Controlled Study for Gender Selection, 56 FERTILITY &
STERILITY254, 255,257 (1991). Ninety-onepercent of the couples pursuing the technique
had only children of the opposite gender already, suggesting that most interested couples
were attempting to actualize compositional, rather than sequential, goals. Twenty-nine
percent had three or more children of the opposite sex. Only 3% had no children at all.
And 2.4% requested sex selection for genetic reasons.
57. "Prenatal diagnosis" provides genetic information about a developing fetus. "Genetic
counseling," on the other hand, is retrospective, typically following the birth of a genetically
handicapped child. "Genetic screening" provides information to individuals about the
normalcy of their own genotype.
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another geneticist who would. The percentage rose from roughly 1 %
in 197359 to roughly 20% in 1977.1 Quite strikingly, that figure rose
still further to 62% in 1985, and has remained stable since.6' This
figure is higher than that reported for geneticists surveyed in India,' and
contrasts starkly with the 36 % figure reflecting the combined results from
18 nations including the United States.1
3
Notwithstanding all this, it is rather widely accepted that no one knows
the actual extent of sex-selection abortions in the U.S.6 4  Surveys
58. Note throughout this discussion that differing methodologies make comparison of
results inexact. For one advocacy group's views, see SEX SELECTION ABORTION: AN
INFORMATION PACKEr PREPARED BY THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE (1991).
59. Christopher Farley, The Debate Over Uses of Prenatal Testing, USA TODAY, Feb.
2, 1989, at 5D; see also F. Clarke Fraser & C. Pressor, Attitudes of Counselors In Relation
to Prenatal Sex-Determination Simply for Choice of Sex, in GENETIC COUNSELING 109, 111
(Herbert A. Lubs & Felix de la Cruz eds., 1977); James R. Sorenson, From Social
Movement to Clinical Medicine - The Role of Law and The Medical Profession in Regulating
Applied Human Genetics, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 467, 481 tbl. I (Aubrey Milunsky
& George J. Annas eds., 1976).
60. Fraser & Pressor, supra note 59. Not surprisingly, given the use of the word
"simply" in the title, the authors operate from the assumption that a "purely personal"
reason for gender preferences, contradistinguished from medical ones, are "trivial."
61. Ethics and Medical Genetics in the United States: A National Survey, 29 AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 815 (1988), cited in Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?
Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection, HASTINGS CENTER REP. May/June 1989, at 21
[hereinafter Wertz & Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?]. This report of a 1985 survey indicated
that 34% of 295 U.S. geneticists would perform prenatal diagnosis for the purpose of sex
selection, and an additional 28 % would refer to another geneticist who would do so (62%
combined). See also Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Ethical Problems in Prenatal
Diagnosis: A Cross-Cultural Survey of Medical Geneticists in 18 Nations, 9 PRENATAL
DIAGNOSIS 145, 148, tbl. 2 (1989) (also reporting 62% combined) [hereinafter Wertz &
Fletcher, Ethical Problenis]. Of the 14 different hypothetical cases posed to the geneticists,
that on a sex-selection abortion procedure unrelated to a sex-linked disorder was the most
controversial, and seemed to present the greatest ethical conflict. Id. at 155; see also John
C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Genetics and the Law: Ethics, Law, and Medical
Genetics: After the Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747, 772, 785, 789, 792
tbls. 1, 5 (1990). Note that while the percentage of geneticists willing to facilitate prenatal
diagnosis for sex selection purposes has plateaued, the "supply," in absolute numbers, will
increase if and as the number of geneticists in the country increases.
62. Wertz & Fletcher, Ethical Problems, supra note 61 (52% combined).
63. Id. Those countries are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, F.R.G., France,
G.D.R., Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Interestingly, of the 605 persons from these
countries who provided reasons for their decision not to facilitate sex selection, only 4.7%
discussed the role of women in society, only 0.5 % discussed maintaining a balanced sex
ratio, and only 4.9% expressed concern for harm to the moral order. Fletcher & Wertz,
supra note 61, at 773.
64. See, e.g., Mark J. Evans et al., Attitudes on the Ethics of Abortion, Sex Selection,
and Selective Pregnancy Termination Among Health Care Professionals, Ethicists, and
Clergy Likely to Encounter Such Situations, 164 AM. J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
1092, 1098 (1991). Planned Parenthood Federation of America and the National Abortion
Rights Action League take the position that the incidence of such procedures are de minimis.
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conducted in 1991 and 1992 indicate that approximately 90% percent of
respondents opposed abortion as a method of selecting the gender of a
child.65 A different poll indicated that 93 % of Americans think it should
be illegal.' An international survey in which 82% of respondents were
U.S. health-care professionals, ethicists, or clergy indicated that 67.2 %,
74.6%, and 92.5% opposed abortion generally for first-, second-, and
third-trimester abortions, respectively. 7
Yet these statistics reveal little about attitudes concerning preconceptive
sex selection. Available information suggests that the acceptance of
preconceptive sex selection among both potential users and potential
practitioners in the United States has increased dramatically in recent
years.' A survey in 1968 of college students, who are part of that
significant group of those in the early-to-middle stages of reproductive
life, found that only 26% would consider using the technique. 9  A
similar study in 1977, however, revealed that 44% may want to use
preselection techniques.' Willingness to select seemed uncorrelated
with social class, sex, or educational level. 71 More recently, a 1988
PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, FACT SHEET 1 (1990); THE NARAL
FOUNDATION, WHO DECIDES? A REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ISSUES MANUAL 2 (1990).
65. Larry Ruggiero, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1991, at A22 (91.3%);
Results From a National Survey: Should Abortion Remain Legal?, WASH. POST, May 17,
1992, PARADE MAG., at 4 (90%).
66. Most in U.S. Favor Ban on Majority ofAbortions, Poll Finds, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
31, 1989, at Al.
67. Evans, supra note 64, at 1094-95 fig. 3. Interestingly, the study indicated no
significant variation among medical specialties, country, sex, age, or religious affiliation of
the respondents. Id. at 1097. Other studies indicate that frequency of church attendance
proved the most dominant predictor. See, e.g., Richard N. Feil et al., Attitudes Toward
Abortion as a Means of Sex Selection, 116 J. PSYCHOL. 269, 271 (1984). In a separate
survey of 317 unmarried college students to determine the acceptability of abortion as a
means of sex selection revealed 17.9% acceptance overall, with males more accepting than
females. Again, frequency of church attendance proved the most dominant predictor. See
also Hartley & Pietraczyk, supra note 27, at 232.
68. See generally Hartley & Pietraczyk, supra note 27, at 232-46; Wertz & Fletcher,
Fatal Knowledge?, supra note 61; ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 44-47
(1990). Even the term "sex preselection" has achieved index status in its own right, after
being subsumed under "genetic engineering" for 15 years. Medical Subject Headings, 32
CUMULATED INDEX MEDICUS 529 (199 1). This is significant because it is INDEX MEDICUS
policy to have subject headings "follow-rather than anticipate-the usage in the literature."
Id. at ix. Preference is given to "terminology that has the support of major professional
organizations, with the realization that few such authorities attain universal acceptance."
Id.
69. Hartley & Pietraczyk, supra note 27, at 234.
70. Id. at 237-38.
71. Id. at 239, 242. Yet Black and Asian women were more likely than their male
counterparts to favor sex preselection strongly. And Blacks were the most likely to express
strong willingness to use sex-selection procedures themselves, and to believe that refinement
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survey by the Office of Technology Assessment found that 14% of
practitioners of artificial insemination regularly offer sperm separation for
preconceptive sex selection. 2 Doctors writing on their experiences in
New York City indicated that "a growing number of couples are
interested in sex preselection. "I The trend toward smaller families, no
doubt, contributes to the demand that has been described as "accelerat-
ing" by Robert Blank, a noted authority of policy approaches to
reproductive technologies.74 Significantly, at least 70 clinics in the
United States already offer sperm separation for the purposes of sex
preselection.
75
D. Polarizing Views on Societal Control of Sex Selection
The fourth reason for immediate consideration of how to address sex
selection is that people are already taking sides. In fact, positions on the
issue are becoming increasingly polarized, with diminishing numbers of
neutral observers.76 There have been numerous calls for the outright
of the technology should be a high priority. Id. at 239-41. There is some evidence from
studies abroad that son preference becomes increasingly pronounced in proportion to the
education of the parents. Vijaya Krishnan, Preferencesfor Sex of Children: A Multivariate
Analysis, 19 J. BIOSOCIAL SCi. 367, 368, 375 (1987) (survey of 1045 Canadian women).
72. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 41 (1988).
73. Masood Khatamee et al., Sex Preselecion in New York City: Who Chooses Which Sex
and Why, 34 INT'L J. FERTILITY 353 (1989). In the author's study of 178 couples
requesting sex preselection procedures, 58 couples were from foreign countries. Each of
the 58 requested a boy, and the following reasons were offered: 14% stated that in their
country it is the custom for male offspring to support their parents in old age, 15 % thought
a male essential for running a family business, 11 % said it was important to have a male
heir for inheritance purposes, 4% said the intellectual powers of females are less highly
developed, and 30% said their culture preferred males. The remainder offered no explana-
tion. The 120 remaining couples selected genders complementary to those they had at
home, suggesting that balancing composition may be one of the biggest motivations for sex
selection in the U.S. See also Jaffe et al., supra note 56, at 255-56 (reporting that all those
of Indian, Asian, Mideastern, and African-American background that had daughters wanted
to conceive sons). This fact raises the question of to what extent, if any, an extraterritorial
effect of U.S. sex-selection procedures should affect domestic policy-making.
74. BLANK, supra note 68, at 46 (noting that the intrusiveness of post-conceptive sex
selection has been holding the demand somewhat in check, and that preconceptive sex
selection "seems to be an area where latent desires of many persons to control the gender
of their progeny could be exploited by an industry that markets sex selection products and
services. It takes little imagination to picture an advertising campaign designed to market
these services to a public that embraces technologies promising to satisfy deep-seated
goals.").
75. Id. There are at least 61 clinics worldwide that use the albumin method of sperm
separation alone. Would You Make a Baby with the Sperm Firm?, supra note 33.
76. For example, two surveys, five years apart, addressing the extent of approval of sex
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prohibition of sex selection through criminal and civil penalties, as well
as vociferous demands that government not get involved. 7  Although
most ;f the contentiousness has been catalyzed by the abortion debate, the
vehement justifications advanced for each policy position extend almost
uniformly to preconceptive, as well as postconceptive technology.
Sweeping efforts to ban or protect preconceptive sex selection may
follow.
E. Premature Legislation
The fifth reason sex selection requires more careful attention is that
some legislators have acted too quickly. All over the country, representa-
tives are pushing bills, even amendments to state constitutions, that
explicitly prohibit it.' While these efforts, explored further below,
focus primarily on the postconceptive abortion context and are no doubt
largely motivated by those principally opposing abortions for any reason,
they appear to capitalize on, and inspire, general objections to sex
selection. Otherwise, sex-selection abortion would not be such a big
issue-especially given its low incidence. Since legislators, like most of
the populous, may be currently unaware of advances of in vitro and
preconceptive gender predetermination techniques, they are likely to adopt
aggressive measures in the near future. Nevertheless, because certain
legislative actions concerning unlikely reproductive matters may
collaterally, even unintentionally, affect the legality of all such tech-
selection within a single set of women revealed such polarization. Of the 15% of the
women who had indicated neutrality on the issue in 1970, almost all registered approval or
disapproval by 1975. Pebley & Westhoff, supra note 50, at 181. There was little change
in the proportion approving of sex selection (37.2% and 37.5% respectively), and the
proportion disapproving increased from 47.8 % to 59.1%. Id.
77. See infra Part III.
78. Laws prohibiting sex selection by abortion, for example, have been passed in
Pennsylvania and Illinois. Abortion Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18., § 3204(c) (Supp.
1990); Illinois Abortion Law, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26, § 6(8) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990). More than 100 abortion bills have been introduced nationwide, most of which
are based on the National Right-to-Life Committee's model, which forbids sex selection in
the abortion context. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1990, at A14. And sex selection has become a
hot topic in election campaigns. The issue, for example, was the subject of much discussion
in the 1990 California gubernatorial race. See, e.g., L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1990, at Mi.
Some in Congress have called it "a grotesque frivolity," 125 CONG. REC. 23,931 (1979)
(remarks of Rep. Mazzoli), and "an appalling barbarity," 125 CONG. REc. 25,822 (1979)
(remarks of Sen. Helms). In Virginia, one delegate remarked that women who abort
pregnancies because they would prefer a baby of the other sex belong "on Dante's lower
rung of hell." WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1990, at B3.
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niques, prospective legislation should be carefully examined for such
effects. In Arkansas, for example, a recent amendment to the state
constitution essentially defines the beginning of life as the moment of
conception.79 Since such a definition could provide a mechanism for
justifying significant restrictions of in vitro, as well as abortive, sex
selection, subsequent legislation might as easily proscribe sex selection for
the purposes of avoiding a sex-linked disease, as for non-medical
purposes.
II. SEX SELECTION: PROS AND CONS
This Part examines sex selection from angles of observation that range
from the most affirmative to the most critical, providing a broad survey
of potential arguments on the issue. Part III will subsequently explain
how these initially independent views of the individual and social
significance of sex selection have tended to accrete and cluster into two
groups, each espousing a unified policy approach.
A. Arguments Supporting Sex Selection
The most extreme perspective on sex selection that favors non-
intervention would be one that sees it as a fundamental right. One could,
for instance, see sex selection as something so inherently and necessarily
within the sphere of opportunities to which a human must have access that
its denial is, in essence, a negation of humanity. An adherent to this
natural-law view might argue that the evolution of humankind was only
made possible by the human will's manipulation of the natural world
through behavior reflecting a sophisticated understanding of cause and
effect. Thus, freedom to use developing technology to pursue the
fulfillment of desire, and to choose the manner and results of one's
reproductive labors, would be seen as both a reflection of, and prerequi-
site for, the continuation and advancement of the species. This technique,
like quests to cure cancer, to combat the vagaries of hazardous accidents,
and to repair and replace vital organs, could be lauded as a hallmark of
a successful and civilized society. Someone viewing sex selection as a
79. ARK. CONST. amend. 68 § 2 (1992), reads:
The policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of every unborn child from
conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal Constitution.
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fundamental right could, in the preconceptive context for instance, believe
that the uses to which a couple puts sperm is its own business-something
so private that any effort by the state to intrude would be invalid.
A less extreme and more utilitarian perspective favoring non-interven-
tion is one that emphasizes tangible benefits to parents, to selected
children, and to society.' For example, parental preferences that drive
the desire to sex select may derive from a variety of sources.
Parents may prefer a given gender for their next child because of either
"sequential" or "compositional" goals. Sequential goals concern
preferences to have offspring of one gender before the other gender.
Compositional goals concern preferences concerning the ratio of genders
within the family. These latter goals may include desires to have more,
or to have exclusively, offspring of a given gender. Compositional goals
may also include desires to complement a child of a given gender with a
younger sibling of the opposite gender, or to have a child of a given
gender after an unbroken string of children of the opposite gender.
Sequential or compositional goals may be motivated by parents
associating different degrees of economic potential, 8 ' status, or parent-
offspring compatibility with each gender. The preference for boys, for
example, may be rooted in the actual or subjectively perceived superiority
of boys in earning potential (e.g., farm labor or business opportunities)
or in the perceived prevalence in boys of parentally desired personality
and behavioral traits (e.g., ambition and sports addiction). In other
instances, parents may simply prefer the symmetry of having both a boy
and a girl, or endeavor to reduce the chances of having a child with a
sex-linked disease. To the extent that parents perceive a differential
benefit in raising a boy or a girl, or a specific combination or sequence
of boys and girls, the achievement of their preferred reality will convey
"happiness" benefits. Whether the existence of such preferences is fact-
based, irrationally prejudiced, or even socially undesirable does not affect
the benefit to, and hence desire of, the individual parents.
Parents, of course, are not the only interested parties, and sex selection
may afford some benefits to selected children and to society as well.
While the approximation of benefits in this context must depend more on
logical possibilities than empirical data, some commentators have
80. See generally WARREN, supra note 3, at 160-77.
81. See David Bloom & Guillermo J. Grenier, The Economics of Sex Preference and Sex
Selection, in SEX SELEcTION OF CHILDREN 113 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983).
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plausibly argued that males and females that are preferentially selected
will feel "especially" wanted, and that fewer children will endure the
displeasure of their parents for being of the "wrong" gender.82 These
are clearly benefits of a sort (although not unqualifiedly so, as will be
discussed below).
Benefits thought to accrue to society include, for example, the
reduction or elimination of certain sex-linked diseases, such as hemophil-
ia, Cooley's anemia, Down's syndrome, and more than 400 others, that
increase aggregate social anxiety, and tax society's medical and financial
resources.' There is also the logical possibility (of as yet speculative
probability) that increased sex selection could offer society the benefits of
a reduced birth rate in two ways.' First, parents seeking a composi-
tional goal will stop "trying" for a particular gender of offspring and
simply get one.' Indeed, survey results indicate that sex selection
would probably produce smaller families. 6 Second, assuming males are
preferentially selected, fewer female births in one generation will simply
mean fewer overall births when these girls reach reproductive age.'1
82. Edward Pholman, Some Effects of Being Able to Control Sex of Offspring, 14
EUGENICS Q., Dec. 1967, at 274, 275-77; see also WARREN, supra note 3, at 173-75.
83. Other prevalent diseases include Tay-Sachs disease, Trisomy 13, spina bifida cystica,
Duchenne's muscular dystrophy, Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome, Hunter's Syndrome, and Fabry
Disease. See generally VICTOR A. McKuSICK, MENDELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN:
CATALOGS OF AUTOSOMAL DOMINANT, AUTOsOMAL RECESSIVE, AND X-LINKED
PHENOTYPES 983 (1983); Scientists Identify Sex of 3-Day-Old Embryo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
19, 1990, at A19. Note that Great Britain's Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization
and Embryology concluded in 1984 that the "new techniques should not be used to provide
parents with children of desired sex, except for the purpose of avoiding sex linked
disorders." Levin, supra note 8, at 184 (emphasis added).
84. It is not always the case that a reduction in birthrate is advantageous. Markets often
benefit from increased numbers of consumers, and the elderly often benefit from larger
numbers of young. The extent to which a reduction is an advantage will depend, in part,
upon the existing birth rate, which varies widely internationally, and the degree of crisis
associated with the provision for basic needs.
85. See PAUL R. EHtRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 61 (1971) ("[l]f a simple method
could be found to guarantee that first-born children were males, then population control
problems in many areas would be somewhat eased."); see also PETER SINGER & DEANE
WELLS, THE REPRODUCTION REVOLUTION: NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES 170 (1984).
86. Deborah S. Freedman et al., Size of Family and Preferencefor Children of Each Sex,
66 Ai. J. Soc. 144 (1960); Charles F. Westhoff& Ronald R. Rindfus, Sex Preselection
in the United States: Some Implications, 184 SCIENCE 633 (May 1974).
87. See Clare B. Luce, Only Women Have Babies, NAT'L REV., July 7, 1978, at 824,
826-27; John Postgate, Bat's Chance in Hell, 58 NEW SCIENTIST 12, 14 (1973).
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B. Arguments Against Sex Selection
The most extreme perspective on sex selection that criticizes its use is
one that regards it as fundamentally evil, a wrong so intrinsically heinous
that it violates all principles of fairness, equal love, and parenthood. 8
Adherents of this natural-law view oppose sex selection because they
believe: it is unnatural, it is playing God, it is inherently sexist, and, if
effected by abortion, it is altogether immoral." These rigid moral
perspectives have already inspired considerable debate.'
A less extreme and more utilitarian perspective on sex selection that
criticizes its use emphasizes deleterious effects. These views are focused
primarily on what economists refer to as "spillovers" or "externalities,"
that is, the costs of an actor's behavior that typically do not accrue to the
actor herself. In context, the costs to a parent of sex selection may
include, among other things, purchasing the necessary technology and
services, the time involved (particularly if repeated attempts are neces-
sary), and the "psychic" costs of overcoming any residual guilt about
88. For some, sex selection is "the original sexist sin." Tabitha Powledge, Unnatural
Selection: On Choosing Children's Sex, in THE CUSTOM-MADE CHILD? WOMEN-CENTERED
PERsPECTIVEs 193, 196 (Helen B. Holmes et al. eds., 1981).
89. For a survey of these criticisms, see WARREN, supra note 3, at 78-108.
90. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 52. In this thoughtful and probing work the author,
who had previously espoused a less strident view, reconsiders, now arguing that "rational
persons," cognizantof the consequences of sex selection, must conclude that it is unethical.
Id. at 337-39, 344-47. Fletcher gives three reasons. First, he argues that "prima facie
examination of any argument for sex selection cannot overcome the unfair and sexist basis
of a choice to select the sex of a child. The desire to control the sex of a child is not
rational, since any claim that is made for the parents' preference for one sex can be
demonstrated to be provided also by the other sex." Second, he states that "on an
examination of the consequences of sex selection, if it were practiced by parents in
significant numbers, the harmful consequences would far outweigh the few fleeting
beneficial consequences. The hypothesis that sex selection might reduce population in less
developed or overpopulated nations cannot be demonstrated without violation of ethical
principles of fairness and beneficence." Id. at 347. Third, the practice cannot stand the
"test of loyalties required to sustain the oldest form of human altruism." Id. at 344.
Fletcher concludes, as well, that gender preferences are irrational desires. In this Fletcher
receives support from Bayles, Reproductive Ethics (1982) (unpublished manuscript), cited
in id. at 342-43. Yet this line of reasoning assumes that there are no gender-specific
behavioral traits, something still hotly debated in social and biological circles. Moreover,
it conveniently ignores that it may be rational to prefer a gender on the basis of that child's
probable development in a specific, albeit sexist, cultural context. While Fletcher and
Bayles may quite rightly prefer that the world did not treat girls and boys differently, that
normative desire cannot drive a practical assessment of rationality. While it may
reciprocally contribute to the problem of gender-stereotyping to expect that a boy is more
likely than is a girl to play football with the father, that does not make it irrational to do
SO.
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preferring one gender over the other and actualizing that preference. 9
The perspectives that criticize sex selection for imposing costs beyond
those just enumerated may be usefully grouped into separate concerns for
women, men, selected children, and society, and may be summarized as
follows.
For women, some think the act of sex selection necessarily exacerbates
already invidious sex discrimination, both because women are treated as
machines to generate the perfect child, and because boys are preferred
over girls. This might cause women to be more strictly confined, at a
societal level, to subordinate roles.' Moreover, and independently, if
sex selectors actually skew the gender ratio in favor of boys, the
decreased percentage of women in society may cause the same result.93
In addition, increases in the percentages of male firstborns could leave
more females with psychological and economic damage commensurate
with "second child syndrome" and the concomitant disempowerment this
yields.' Finally, some supporters of abortion rights argue that, since
91. A study of the amnio/abortion method, for example, attempted to aggregate economic,
psychological, and time costs to successful sex selection, such as diagnoses, abortion
procedures, and repeated pregnancies. It concluded that, at least in this context, the
individual costs will deter most potential sex selectors from actualizing their gender
preferences. Frances E. Kobrin & Robert G. Potter, Sex Selection Through Amniocentesis
and Selective Abortion, in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN 47 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983).
As other methods improve, these costs may be much less.
92. WARREN, supra note 3; Tabitha Powledge, Toward a Moral Policy for Sex Choice,
in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN 201, 204-05 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983). This disempow-
erment may even make those women preferring not to sex select more vulnerable to a
partner's pressure to do so.
93. WARREN, supra note 3, at 132-39. This effect may be quite difficult to predict,
however, because one significant study concluded that the scarcity of women could actually
increase their "dyadic" (two-person) power; they will have more options between suitors
and may be able to maximize options and upward mobility. Nevertheless, studies of several
modem and historical populations with sex ratio imbalances discovered cultures character-
ized by: "bride-price and bride-service, great importance attached to virginity, emphasis
on the sanctity of the family, proscriptions against adultery[,] ... marriage at an early
age[,] ... and women regarded as inferior to men in reasoned judgment, scholarship and
political affairs.' MARCIA GUTTENTAG & PAUL SECORD, TOO MANY WOMEN? THE SEX
RATIO QUESTION 79 (1983). Thus, whether in fact a preponderance of males will benefit
or harm women will probably depend, in part, upon the extent to which males monopolize
structural power. Greater entrenchment may mean less power and fewer rights.
94. See Alder, Characteristics of the First, Second and Third Child, 3 CHILDREN: THE
MAGAZINE FOR PARENTS 14 (1928); see also William Altus, Birth Order and its Sequelae,
151 SCIENCE 44 (1968) (girl born following a boy has lower self-esteem than if following
an older sister); WARREN, supra note 3, at 132. The effects of birth order remain
controversial, however. One exhaustive analysis of the past forty years of studies argued
that nearly all conclusions of birth-order effects were due to errors in the design and analysis
of the studies. CECILE ERNST & JULES ANGST, BIRTH ORDER: ITS INFLUENCE ON
PERSONALITY 3-14 (1983).
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abortion is sometimes used only for sex selection, the public perceptions
of negative consequences of sex selection may tip the balance decisively
in favor of the anti-abortion position, leading to the complete prohibition
of abortion.
95
For men, these arguments are more attenuated, but no less fervently
maintained. Fewer "available" women, it is argued, will mean either
enforced celibacy or greater recourse to prostitution. 6  In addition,
some believe that increases in polyandrous and homosexual relationships
may ensue.97 There would also be, some have surmised, a rise in
aggregate male "unhappiness" due to widespread inability to pursue
heterosexual relations or to marry. 9'
For selected children, adherents of this perspective highlight the
possibility of psychological burden. Parents may have had unreasonable
expectations, overestimating the extent to which having a child of a
particular gender would increase their happiness. Their disappointment
may be taken out on the selected children." Those children born
consequent to unsuccessful efforts to select sex may incur similar
hardship, either from learning that they were unwanted, or from
experiencing parental resentment and hostility in the face of "failure."
Finally, societal consequences could be far-reaching." Some have
95. See, e.g., Haig H. Kazazian, Prenatal Diagnosis for Sex Choice: A Medical View,
THE HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1980, at 17; Mary Ann Glendon & George Weigel,
Viewpoints: The Abortion Dilemma, NEWSDAY, May 8, 1990, at 61 (arguing that opposition
to sex selection may valuably serve as a "beachhead" for those opposing abortions, even
though many women seek these for reasons other than sex selection). Admittedly, some
may view this as a benefit. Yet regardless of one's position on abortion, it seems
intellectually disingenuous to achieve a sweeping prohibition of a form of behavior by
playing on indignation against a proportionally tiny incidence of subjective motivation for
that behavior.
96. WARREN, supra note 3, at 132.
97. Id. at 133; see also PAUL SINGER & DOROTHY WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW
SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 153 (1985). Those who argue this betray unproven
assumptions concerning the cause, and undesirability, of homosexuality. Note, in any
event, that although Alaska has a gender ratio of 132:100 there has been no perceptible rise
in homosexuality. Steinbacher, supra note 47, at 6.
98. WARREN, supra note 3, at 132.
99. Powledge, supra note 92, at 201-02. "Satisfying parental requests for sex would not
satisfy their desires, because their desires are not really for a girl or a boy, but for a child
that will carry out certain acts its parents believe will make them content: continuing the
family business, becoming a doctor, winning at Wimbledon. It is the acts that are
important, not the sex of the actor, and that matters only because cultural expectations
associate particular deeds with one sex or the other." Id. at 203.
100. On possible effects of changes in the sex ratio, see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 136-41 (1992). For examples of sophisticated analysis of sex selection, see
generally P.A. Rogerson, The Effects of Sex Preselection on the Sex Ratio of Families, 82
J. OF HEREDITY 239 (1991); Dan H. Moore & Barton L. Gledhill, How Large Should My
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argued, for example, that a greater percentage of males will result in both
increased local and international violence.'' No less significantly, class
conflicts could intensify to the extent that sex selection is a privilege for
those most able to pay for it." Sex selection would also set a "danger-
ous" precedent for even more disastrous and more intrusive genetic
engineering.0 3 Finally, some argue that sex selection procedures that
involve medical diagnosis or treatment, such as in the amniocente-
sis/abortion context, may create an "excessive" drain on an important
medical resource at the expense of parents needing access to facilities or
procedures for more medically compelling purposes." 4
III. EXISTING APPROACHES: NON-
INTERVENTION OR PROHIBITION
The wide variety of views just sketched clustered and consolidated,
leaving two principal camps: one advocating that governments not
intrude on the issue of sex selection, and the other advocating governmen-
tal prohibition. Since most effective prohibitions require government
intervention, the two camps are currently at loggerheads, presumed in the
existing literature to be irreconcilable.
Study Be So That I Can Detect an Altered Sex Ratio?, 50 FERTILITY & STERILITY 21
(1988); Fred Arnold, Measuring the Effect of Sex Preference on Fertility: The Case of
Korea, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 280 (1985); Radheshyam Bairagi, A Comment on Fred Arnold's
"Measuring the Effect of Sex Preference on Fertility", 24 DEMoGRAPHY 137 (1987); Fred
Arnold, The Effect of Sex Preference on Fertility: A Reply to Bairagi, 24 DEMOGRAPHY 139
(1987).
101. Amitai Etzioni, Sex Control, Science, and Society, 161 SCIENCE 1107, 1109 (1968);
see also WARREN, supra note 3, at 126-29. This argument is undercut, however, by the
peaceful character of the Eskimos and the Arapesh, in both of which societies males
decisively outnumberfemales. See KAI BIRKET-SMITH, THE EsKIMOS 52 (1959); MARGARET
MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMIvTIVE SocIETIES (1963).
102. WARREN, supra note 3, at 154-58.
103. See, e.g., Evans et al., supra note 64, at 1098 (opining that sex selection is a
precedent for eugenics, and that "every precedent for eugenics in this generation should be
prevented"); WARREN, supra note 3, at 132. See also Arthur R. Kroeber, Eugenics Makes
a Comeback, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 1, 1989 (quoting medical sociologist Dorothy C. Wertz
as stating that sex selection "is a slippery slope situation [opening] the door to selection on
cosmetic grounds").
104. For Many, Picking a Child's Genderis a Fertile Field, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1990,
at El ("At a time when we still have tens of thousands of Californians who can't get health
care, why spend resources to pick the sex of babies?"); AUBREY MILUNSKY, KNOW YOUR
GENES 277 (1977). But see John C. Fletcher, Ethics and Public Policy: Should Sex Choice
Be Discouraged?, in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN 213, 226-27 (Neil G. Bennett ed.,
1983).
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This polarity has dramatically divided the usually aligned, albeit not
identical, feminist groups." 5 The debate over sex selection is particu-
larly complex and volatile because it confronts feminists with a paradox
that strains theory with the weight of consequence. " On the one hand,
to prohibit sex selection is to compromise reproductive freedom, perhaps
leading to further restrictions. 7 In the amniocentesis/abortion context,
for example, allowing any substantive inquiry into the reasons for an
abortion may permit additional normative scrutiny of a woman's
justifications."°  On the other hand, to allow sex selection, and the
preponderance of males that may result, is quite possibly to cause
disenfranchisement of women from the power structures of society."°
At the moment, therefore, there is no unified, nor even centralized,
feminist position. Feminists are as divided as is the general popula-
tion. "1'
105. The term "feminist" is admittedly overgeneralizing, and is used with some regret.
Although the author recognizes the extraordinary diversity of perspectives deemed
"feminist," the term is intended as shorthand for a perspective that espouses increased
control by women of their bodies and their professional and personal lives.
106. For focused analysis of the feminist perspectives, see Roberta Steinbacher, Futuristic
hnplications of Sex Preselection, in THE CUSTOM-MADE CHILD? WOMEN-CENTERED
PERSPECrIVEs 187 (Helen B. Holmes et al. eds., 1981). Of course, the diversity of feminist
thought may preclude a unified critique. See generally Norma J. Wikler, Society's Response
to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043
(1986).
107. "Feminist theory points to the conclusion that women will be the losers when
reproductive power is controlled in important ways by a cadre of experts working in a
patriarchal system." Wikler, supra note 106, at 1050.
108. Glendon & Weigel, supra note 95, at 61 (arguing that opposition to sex selection
may valuably serve as a "beachhead" for those opposing abortions, even though many
women seek these for reasons other than sex selection).
109. Empirical evidence from several modem and ancient populations composed of less
than 50% females suggests that such proportions would further undermine women's
perceived validity. See Helen Holmes & Bob Hoskins, Prenatal and Preconception Sex
Choice Technologies: A Path to Femicide? (1984), cited in 'Wikler, supra note 106, at 1045
(paperpresented at the Second International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women, Women's
Worlds: Strategies for Empowerment, in Gronigen, Netherlands); see also Catharine
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1317 n.157
(1991). Similarly, the difficulty echoes the surrogacy dilemma; prohibition would restrict
liberty, but surrogacy might as a practical matter create a caste of poor women servicing the
childless rich.
110. There is, of course, no reason why feminist positions must be unified. Fora variety
of feminists' perspectives, see COREA, supra note 40. An international network has been
formed to monitor reproductive technologies and to develop feminist policy on their use.
Wikler, supra note 106, at 1057.
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A. The Non-Intervention Model
There are three existing approaches to non-intervention. The first
emphasizes the affirmative value of sex selection, and the latter two,
which are not mutually exclusive, are more concerned with the significant
disadvantages of government intervention.
1. The Market Approach
Adherents of the market approach, presumably, are those who want to
allow individuals to pursue their own good in their own ways. These
may include people who own or operate sex selection clinics, who are
necessary for intermediate sex-determination procedures, or who
themselves want to use sex-selection technology. At the moment, no one
has openly championed this view, perhaps fearing that highlighting the
issue will inspire more hostility than it already draws.
2. The "Doctors Dissuade" Approach
Adherents of what might loosely be termed the "Doctors Dissuade"
approach oppose legal prohibitionbut advocate prevention of sex-selection
behavior through deterrence from within the medical community. One
collaboration of prominent doctors, for example, believing legal
prohibition inadvisable, opined that sex selection was a precedent for
eugenics"' and that "every precedent for eugenics in this generation
should be prevented.""' This leaves one to wonder precisely who will
be doing the "preventing."
Other writers, too, stopped short of advocating legal prohibition
because
laws prohibiting abortion for sex selection are appropriate only
where there is evidence that abuse of the medical indications
for prenatal diagnosis .... Where abuse does not exist, laws
prohibiting sex selection abortions are not only unneeded but
may set harmful precedents restricting abortion choices."'
111. "Eugenics" indicates improvement of a race through breeding or genetic
engineering.
112. Evans et al., supra note 64, at 1098 (emphasis added).
113. Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 61, at 789-90.
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Many argue that doctors should combat sex selection by trying to
dissuade would-be selectors, or even by intentionally withholding gender
information. Two researchers on the subject, for example, not only
proposed that prenatal diagnosis for sex selection "should be avoided"
(except in the context of gender-linked diseases), but advised that
[i]f patients have a genetic reason for diagnosis and also show
excessive interest in the gender of the fetus, geneticists can
consider delayed disclosure of gender after timely disclosure
of clinical findings." 4
Reasoning that "[p]renatal diagnosis for a nonmedical reason makes a
mockery of medical ethics," these two espouse "judicious use of hospital
and laboratory policy" to deter sex selection."'
The first way to do so, according to these researchers, is to enact
"professional codes of medical ethics, including those of national specialty
boards and state medical societies.. . to discourage private doctors from
using prenatal diagnosis for sex selection.""' 6 This would involve
controlling licensure, and disciplining or suspending physicians who
violate such codes. "Such moral guidance by the profession would not
prevent all sex selection, for codes would vary from state to state and it
is likely that the most obvious violators would be disciplined. Neverthe-
less, a professional stand on the question could go a long way toward
preventing widespread abuse. 117  Second, those considering sex
selection would be invited to optimal sites to be lectured on physicians'
opposition to sex selection. There they would learn that, as a "general
moral policy," sex selection not medically indicated would "not be
provided.".. While doctors' attention seems focused primarily on
abortion, their opposition to sex selection seems to go beyond the abortion
context, strongly suggesting antipathy to sex selection in general.
114. Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
115. Wertz & Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?, supra note 61, at 21-26.
116. Id. at21.
117. Id. at 26; see also Bernard M. Dickens, Prenatal Diagnosis and Female Abortion:
A Case Study in Medical Law and Ethics, 12 J. MED. ETHICS 143 (1986) (medical
profession should preempt state legislation by subjecting physicians to professional discipline
for performing sex selection abortion); Schedler, supra note 1, at 313; SINGER & WELLS,
supra note 85, at 154.
118. John C. Fletcher, Is Sex Selection Ethical, in RES. ETHICS (Kare Berg & Knut
Tmeoy eds., 1983).
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3. The "Social Exhortation" Approach
Like the Doctors Dissuade approach, proponents of the "Social
Exhortation" approach believe that legal prohibition is a bad idea. Some,
for example, while believing that sex selection "is the original sexist sin,"
simply find prohibition the greater of evils:" 9
To forbid women to use prenatal diagnostic techniques as a
way of picking the sexes of their babies is to begin to delin-
eate acceptable and unacceptable reasons to have an abor-
tion.... To make it illegal to use prenatal diagnostic tech-
niques for sex choice is to nibble away at our hard-won
reproductive control .... "
Left with a "perniciously sexist technology," the prohibition of which
would also be "perniciously sexist," the prominent feminist author
Tabitha Powledge, for example, counsels that:
We may want to turn to such time-honored measures as
boycotts, and putting pressure on funders not to underwrite
such research. We may also want to give some attention to a
mechanism that appears weak, but may be undervalued:
moral exhortation. We must say over and over again to
friends and neighbors, in the pages of magazines and newspa-
pers, on television and radio, that this technology, even if
available, should simply not be used.'
2 '
Powledge also suggests eliminating funding for, and actively discourag-
ing, studies on the very existence of sex preferences, which presumably
both create as well as reflect sex preferences and provide valuable
information to entrepreneurs.'
119. Powledge, supra note 88, at 196. "To destroy an extant fetus [on the basis of
gender] is more morally opprobrious than techniques aimed at conceiving a child of a
particular sex, but they are both deeply wrong." Id.
120. Id. at 197.
121. Id. at 198; see also Powledge, supra note 92, at 201.
122. Id. at 209-11.
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B. The Prohibition Model
Adherents of the prohibition model advocate legislative eradication of
sex selection. Not surprisingly, most of the impetus for prohibition
centers on sex selections using postconceptive abortion, the most widely
known technique. One article on that subject, for example, makes an
argument for punishing sex-selection abortions, and considers the only
remaining debate to be over the form such punishment should take.In3
In fact, legislation has already been passed in Illinois and Pennsylvania
outlawing sex selection abortions. Bills to do the same have been
introduced in virtually every state in the nation."2 Ninety-three percent
of Americans, and fifty percent of U.S. geneticists think sex-selection
abortions should be illegal,"z and the two most prominent articles on
the subject conclude that outright prohibitions are appropriate and would
survive constitutional scrutiny.'26
Yet most of the reasons advanced for prohibiting sex selection in the
abortion context extend equally to all sex-selection behavior, suggesting
that one must consider this prohibition model as having prospective
vitality for sex selection in general. The feminist scholar Catharine
MacKinnon, for example, when explaining that sex selection "should not
be permitted," writes:
[I]n a context of mass abortions of female fetuses, the pres-
sures on women to destroy potential female offspring are
tremendous and oppressive unless restrictions exist. While
under conditions of sex inequality monitoring women's reasons
for deciding to abort is worrying, the decision is not a free
one, even absent governmental intervention, where a male life
is valued and a female life is not."z
123. Schedler, supra note 1, at 311-15.
124. See supra note 78.
125. Most in U.S. FavorBan on Majority ofAborions, Poll Finds, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
31, 1989, at Al. Wertz & Fletcher, Ethical Problems, supra note 61, at 149 thl. 3
(corresponding figure for the 17 other nations, excluding the U.S., is 89 %); see also Evans
et al., supra note 64.
126. John R. Shaibley, mll, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the
Abortion Liberty and a Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 282 (1981); Schedler, supra
note 1.
127. MacKinnon, supra note 109, at 1317 n.157; cf. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RES., SCREENING AND
COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 57-59 (1983) (recommendingthat geneticists reject
sex selection because it violates the principle of equality between females and males), cited
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Although MacKinnon writes in the context of postconceptive sex
selection, and recognizes the complexity of her position, her analysis of
pressure and oppression in the sex selection abortion context is not
logically distinct from one addressing sex-selection in general. Her
concern that tremendous oppressive forces can improperly compel a
woman to abort extends equally, perhaps even more easily, into the less
emotionally wrenching preconceptive arena, where a woman's decision
would be equally constrained.
IV. CRITIQUING EXISTING APPROACHES
The existing approaches to sex selection do not reflect the many and
subtle distinctions among attitudes in a diverse population. The vocal
minorities at the most extreme ends of issues such as animal rights and
abortion dominate in the news, although not in the polls. Most Ameri-
cans want to eat beef, but object to animal experiments that somehow
cross the line. Most Americans believe abortion should be available to
a woman in some contexts,"u but would prefer that she not be allowed
to treat the process cavalierly. It seems reasonable to conclude, similarly,
that most Americans can conceive of circumstances in which sex selection
should be allowed, but prefer that such procedures not reach mammoth
proportions. The existing approaches, dominated by the antagonistic
prohibitionists and non-interventionists, do not allow for this intermediate
position.
While only prohibitory and non-interventionist models have evolved,
it is apparent that supporters of these policy extremes are not all
extremists themselves. Dividing them by the way they think (the process
by which they reach a conclusion), rather than by what they think (the
conclusion they actually reach), immediately erodes the basis for
concluding that the positions are irreconcilable. Consequently, the
remainder of this Article divides the supporters of each model into their
constituent parts, assesses whether the models espoused are necessary
consequents of the perspectives advanced to support them, and, conclud-
ing that they are not, addresses in Part V the prospects for regulatory
compromises. Such compromises, while possibly leaving the extremists
in Wertz & Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?, supra note 61.
128. Maralee Schwartz& Ann Devroy, Women in Poll Voice Economic Concerns, WASH.
POST, Sept. 4, 1992, at A13.
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as dissatisfied as before, could go a long way toward negotiating reduced
hostility between the camps. At the very least, removing from the
supporters of each model those whose concerns can be adequately
addressed with alternative measures enables a more sophisticated view of
the existing struggle.. It highlights, as a tide receding, those aspects of
the island-like opponents that enable a more precise estimation of their
numbers, worth, and arguments, as well as of subsurface connections
between them.
Consequently, this Part first examines two overarching failures that
have characterized the debate over sex selection, and then critiques each
approach individually.
A. Refining the Issues
Neither the non-intervention camp nor the prohibition camp is
homogenous. Each contains individuals with varying strengths of
conviction, and, more importantly, with varying reasons for their
positions. The two overarching failures of these groups discussed below
each involve the participants' inability to divide the issue of sex selection
and its social critique into constituent parts, along the lines demarcated by
their reasons. Such failures lead to hasty demands and ill-considered
legislation that, even if necessary consequents of the extremist positions
within the constituency, are dramatically overaggressive positions for
those with more moderate views. This creates a situation in which the
demands are, in effect, "overbroad," even if one were to assume that the
logic buttressing those demands were irrefutable.
1. Separating Preconceptive from Postconceptive Contexts
First, as the earlier summary of existing approaches to sex selection
makes clear, it is important to separate the question of abortion from the
question of preconceptive sex selection. Too many have intertwined
arguments for or against each, failing to recognize important distinc-
tions.'29 Abortion is simply one form, the most prominent form, of
postconceptive selection techniques." 3  Legal literature, of course,
129. See, e.g., Evans et al., supra note 64 (failing to differentiate sex-selection attitudes
from abortion attitudes, lumping the two together).
130. A Venn diagram of abortion procedures and sex-selection procedures would show
two circles overlapping slightly. Most abortions, undoubtedly, have nothing to do with sex
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reflects a great deal on the subject of abortion, and even a little on the
subject of sex-selection abortion. Little attention has been paid, however,
to the separate but related issue of modern preconceptive sex selection.
While there may be underlying motivations that may justify a similar
attitude toward this and toward sex-selection abortions,'131 the arguments
from the abortion context simply cannot appropriately be transplanted
without further reflection.
There are a number of superficial similarities that may suggest that the
two can be addressed from the same perspective. Both concern reproduc-
tion, for example, and both involve exerting control over what may be
born. Both are binary: boy or girl, born or not. Both are quintessential-
ly products of the modern, technological age-non-natural and non-
primitive. Both require professional procedures, implicating safety
concerns and some sort of health regulation. Each implicates women
more directly than men. And each can be characterized as helping an
individual avoid the unwanted, or at least the lesser-wanted.
Yet the differences between abortion and preconceptive sex selection
are more profound. Abortion terminates a process of development
already started. The most promising sex-selection techniques prescribe
what is about to begin. Abortion concerns life, while sex selection
concerns a precise manifestation of life. One is about preventing a birth,
and the other about controlling an aspect of it. Abortion can happen
without human intervention, and sex determination will happen even
without human intervention. Abortion requires destruction; sex determi-
nation involves creation. And, importantly, from a "state interests"
perspective, the former is presently far more physically dangerous to
women.
Significantly, most abortions negate a fetus that probably would have
come to term. Yet one half of all the sex-selection results would have
occurred anyway. None of the class disfavored by abortion (fetuses) lives
to experience that prejudice. Yet many of the class disfavored by sex
selection, principally women, may experience the prejudice the processes
manifest.
From the perspective of those opposing abortion, the rights sought to
be vindicated are those, asserted vicariously, of the existing-but-unborn.
selection, and the most promising sex-selection techniques have nothing to do with abortion.
131. For a study noting some correlation between approval of sex selection and general
approval of abortion, see Pebley & Westhoff, supra note 50, at 182.
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The consequentialists opposing preconceptive sex selection, on the other
hand, can hardly assert standing to vindicate the rights of the as-yet-
unconceived, and instead assert the rights of the living who are affected
by another's birth.
2. Separating the Absolutists from the Consequentialists
Second, and most significantly, the absolutists (those for whom sex
selection is either fundamentally wrong or fundamentally non-prohibita-
ble) should be separated from the consequentialists (those for whom the
ramifications of sex selection, or its alternatives, dictate a position).
Upon reflection, one can observe that the amalgam of those advocating
prohibition of sex selection contains:
(1) those opposing sex selection in any form for moral reasons;
(2) those opposing it only because imbalanced gender preferences
may create various social ills;
(3) those opposing it primarily in the context of abortion, believing
abortion objectionable per se, while sex selection itself is not;
and
(4) those only opposing abortions performed for reasons of gender.
Similarly, the group of those advocating non-intervention contains:
(1) those believing the control of family composition, free from
interference, to be a fundamental right; and
(2) those fearing that government intervention in the context of sex
selection will be a precursor to undesirable government interven-
tion in other reproductive matters.
The absolutists in each camp, for whom the significance of sex
selection is independent of the frequency with which it occurs, cannot be
satisfied with compromise. Their reasoning adopts, in essence, a natural-
law approach that by definition is capable of only one, and total,
vindication.
Yet, there are those for whom sex selection or its deterrence presage
undesirable consequences that are especially objectionable when wide-
spread. This group may be satisfied by compromise. For the utilitarian-
minded consequentialists, therefore, the existing models ofprohibitionand
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non-intervention are consistent with consequentialist concerns, but not
necessary to alleviate those concerns.
B. Sex Selection and Law
It is clearly impossible to prove, from any objective perspective, which
of the absolutist groups, if either, is "right." Absolutists have at their
disposal, in our democratic society, only the tools of persuasion and the
vote to encourage enactment of the laws they support. Policymakers
should give careful attention to consequentialist arguments about what the
future would hold if either a non-interventionist or prohibitory policy
were implemented.
We can start from the proposition that, whatever our own moral views
on sex selection, both the consequentialist opponents and the consequen-
tialist proponents have reasonable, if competing, concerns. The
opponents of sex selection quite properly recognize that the pervasive
preference for boys, coupled with the emergence of a promising
technology enabling actualization of that preference, strongly suggests a
large market for sex-selection services. The eventual incidence of sex
selection could cause demographic shifts and commensurate disruption of
unknown, but ominous, proportions.
The proponents of the freedom to sex-select, on the other hand, are
properly concerned that heavy-handed attempts to rigidify the gender ratio
status quo ignore preferences that do in fact exist and prevent individuals
from pursuing their view of optimal family life. This portends massive
governmental intrusions into reproductive matters and the infringement of
existing liberties. Given the myriad justifications for and against sex
selection (some of which are intuitively appealing, and some of which
seem more fanciful than probable), it at first seems difficult to place this
behavior on the continuum sweeping from fundamental rights to frivolous
luxuries.
If the opportunity to use sex-selection procedures were a fundamental
constitutional right, one protected from state government interference by
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Liberty Clause, the applicable legal standard would typically
require "strict scrutiny" of any law interfering with its exercise. Strict
scrutiny, as it is currently formulated, asks whether the law is "neces-
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sary" to protect a "compelling" state interest.' To date, only a few
select values, such as freedom of speech, press, association, and religion,
have claimed such special consideration.
No one knows how to delineate precisely the boundary between general
liberty interests and constitutionally protected liberty interests. Justice
Harlan put it best, explaining that there is no formula, no code, and no
shortcut to apt conclusions, when he stated that the full scope of liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause represents "a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints ...and which also recognizes,
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgement." 33 We are left, then, with our reasoned judgment,
and specific contexts in which the Court has struck a balance between
individual liberties and "the demands of organized society." "
One initially suspects that gender preselection cannot be a fundamental
and inalienable right. Rights do not spring into being by virtue of
technological evolution. There is in our society, for example, no
fundamental right to have a car, despite the enormity of business and
pleasure opportunities that it affords.
Certainly sex selection is not a right enumerated in the Constitution.
But is it, perhaps, some species of unenumerated right protected by the
Constitution and the Supreme Court-as is the controversial right to
privacy, which includes, for example, vague rights protecting certain
reproductive matters and issues of 'family?" 35 Scholars debate the
propriety and mechanism of "discovering" unenumerated but judicially
protectable rights. Yet current jurisprudence assumes that such rights do
exist, despite the fact that there is no easily articulable criteria to enable
definitive identification. Reiterating language typically used as an
approximation of such criteria, for example, Justice Scalia recently
observed:
132. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 634-38 (1969); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-
06 (1976). For further discussion of the various levels of scrutiny, see Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
133. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
134. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (city cannot
exclude grandchildren from a home zoned for "single family dwelling units").
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It is an established part of our constitutional jurisprudence that
the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause extends beyond
freedom from physical restraint. . . In an attempt to limit
and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not
merely that the interest denominated as a "liberty" be "funda-
mental" (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but
also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society.
As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords only those
protections "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." Our cases reflect
"continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history
[and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society . ,,36
This line of reasoning suggests a useful two-part inquiry into: (1)
historical evidence of our society's traditional protection of sex selection;
and (2) evidence indicating that sex selection is a basic societal value.
One might think that the first part of the inquiry could be handled with
dispatch: since the technology enabling sex selection is of remarkably
recent vintage, there can be no historical evidence of its "traditional"
protection. Yet this reasoning fails for two reasons. First, only now, for
the first time, is the concept of protection truly relevant. Only when an
activity can be limited does its protection become an issue. The home
methods of preconceptive sex selection (and, to a lesser extent, of
postconceptive or post-birth sex selection), whatever their success rates,
were never something that could, as a practical matter, be prevented.
They were thus, in a certain sense, functionally, albeit not formally,
shielded from government intrusion.
Second, the nature of an act does not vary as easily as does its method,
and it is generally more appropriate that analysis of rights attend more to
the former than to superficial vagaries of the latter. Were the home
techniques, such as special diets, to become more widely accepted as
successful, no one could seriously suggest that the government could
appropriately infringe on a fundamental right considered too basic to
explain: the right to eat the food one wants. If the nature of sex
selection, then, involves matters typically regarded as private and bodily,
it becomes difficult to draw a logical distinction that reconciles protecting
136. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989) (citations omitted).
Fall, 199:2]
HeinOnline  -- 6 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 37 1992-1993
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
the right to sex-select at home, and curtailing the right that should attend
to such behavior in a clinic. Consequently, the results of the first prong
of the analysis are indeterminate.
The second part of the two-part inquiry, which looks for evidence
indicating that sex selection is a basic societal value, requires more
probing. Certain legal precedents suggest useful extrapolation. Few
would disagree that an individual has the general right to remain free of
government interference with her very ability to have a child. The
Supreme Court, reflecting on that issue in Skinner v. Oklahoma,37
found a particular scheme for the compulsory sterilization of certain
classes of criminals violative of a "fundamental interest" protected by the
Fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, stated that "[w]e are dealing here with legislation which
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
138
These words were later echoed when Douglas described marriage as
"intimate to the degree of being sacred."' 39  Thus, the marital relation-
ship, in the context of which, obviously, many births occur, rests within
a fundamental area of privacy protected, in part, by the Ninth Amend-
ment"4 and by "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights generally 4 -an
area that can be disturbed only to vindicate a "compelling state inter-
est." 42  Justice Douglas's comment reflects a popular intertwining of
the very concepts of marriage and procreation that, although not
technically necessary, may mean that the law on marriage could affect our
analysis of sex selection.
Yet the modem age has begun to pry apart this link of marriage and
procreation. Contraceptive technology has increasingly enabled previous-
ly and potentially procreative acts to be enjoyed outside of marital
relationships. Similar advances in technology have demonstrated that
even the traditionally procreative act is unnecessary for a woman to bear
a child."' These scientific advances, as well as the changing social
137. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
138. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
139. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
140. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
141. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
142. Id. at 496 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
143. One recent case has even held that a woman has a fundamental right "to become
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contexts in which single parenthood is increasingly widespread, suggest
that the analysis of childbearing is wholly separate from an analysis of
marriage. A childbearing analysis is more likely to illuminate the sex-
selection issues.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,1" the Court concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed the right to "establish a home and bring up
children .... ,"t' Similarly, in the oft-quoted language of Eisenstadt
v. Baird,"~ the Supreme Court emphasized "the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free of unwarranted government intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."147 Yet the operative language in these cases is
to "bring up" a child and to "beget a child," not to "bring up" a boy or
to "beget" a girl. No court has gone further. Clearly there is a
distinction between being able to pass on one's genes at all and being able
to create a child of the gender one prefers. The former fulfills a basic
drive to replicate, while the latter affords the additional power to dictate
certain terms of replication. In this respect, sex selection seems closer
to vindicating a want than a need. This distinction, alone, is probably of
sufficient magnitude to suggest that sex selection is not currently within
the realm of those things recognized as fundamental rights, and a
reviewing court is unlikely to apply strict scrutiny to a state law posing
formidable obstacles to sex selection.
The next tier of scrutiny, which finally achieved independent status in
the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,"4
renders unconstitutional any legislation that imposes an "undue burden"
upon (in other words a "substantial obstacle" in the way of) someone
seeking to vindicate certain special rights.' 4 9 It is unclear whether this
pregnant by artificial insemination" if she so desires. Cameron v. Board of Educ. of the
Hillsboro, Ohio, City Sch. Dist., 795 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
144. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
145. Id. at 399.
146. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
147. Id. at 453.
148. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
149. The "undue burden" standard, as previously articulated in Justice O'Connor's dissent
in City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983), was
originally formulated as a "threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court can
require a State to justify its legislative actions under the exacting compelling state interest"
standard. In other words, undue burden analysis, early in its development, served only as
the gatekeeper of strict scrutiny. Undue burden, emancipated by Casey, now occupies a
position in the hierarchy of rigorous analysis that leaves it less demanding than strict
scrutiny, but somewhat more demanding than intermediate scrutiny. See Planned
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undue burden standard applies most poignantly only in the context of the
sui generis abortion right, or whether it might properly apply to sex
selection as well. Were the Court to see sex selection as sufficiently
similar to abortion, in its antagonism of reproductive liberties and state
interests, to warrant application of the undue burden standard, one could
conclude that legislation prohibiting sex selection would be unconstitution-
al.
Yet a careful reading of Casey suggests that the Court would not link
abortion and sex selection in a determinative way. The Court uses,
loosely, two planks upon which to construct the conclusion that a woman
has the right to abort: one concerns protections afforded to family and
procreative matters, and the other concerns matters of bodily integrity.
With respect to the former, we are counseled that it is "a promise of
the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter."'' The Court thus justifies its qualified
protection of the abortion right, in part, by placing the decision to abort
within that category of things, "originating within the zone of conscience
and belief," that involve "a person's most basic decisions," most
"intimate relationships," and the "most intimate and personal choices"
that are "central to personal dignity and autonomy," as well as to "bodily
integrity."' This category clearly includes, in the words of the Court,
"a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood,"' 52
including those about "procreation."' 53 Consequently, this category of
protected behavior could easily encompass the decision about what gender
to beget.
The Court, of course, has not yet had cause to parse the meaning of
the word "procreation," and it would be disingenuous to shoehorn sex
selection too quickly into a pre-existing arena of protected behavior
merely on the basis of the word's lack of precision. Yet even so, it is not
apparent that the interests one vindicates in protecting procreation
generally can be segregated, in a principled fashion, from those specifi-
cally involved in sex selection. If a person has the capacity to choose and
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (1991); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct.,
at 2866-67. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (referring to strict scrutiny and undue burden
analyses, together, as "heightened scrutiny").
150. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
151. Id. at 2806-10.
152. Id. at 2806; see also id. at 2807 (referring to the "private realm of family life," and
citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
153. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
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control the number of children she begets as a consequence of procreative
acts, and has this substantial and technologically facilitated control over
the size of her family (and even the spacing between children), why
should she not be as free affirmatively to compose the gender ratio of her
family? And if at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is the right to define one's own concept of "the mystery of
human life,"" should an individual not be free to demystify procre-
ation by manipulating its purely mechanical processes in such a way as
to vindicate her personal desires?
At the same time, with respect to bodily integrity, abortion and sex
selection cannot be thoroughly mixed. The holding in Casey was
justified, in large measure, on the intrusiveness of forcing childbearing
on a woman who wants to abort.'55 Justice Blackmun, writing in
concurrence, described this graphically as "conscript[ing] women's bodies
into service . ,,. "' That degree of physical intrusiveness is far
greater in the context of deciding whether a woman must bear a child or
not than it is in the context of interfering with whether a child so born
will be male or female. Consequently, and given the ideological struggle
that tipped so slightly in favor of abortion protections in Casey, it would
be imprudent to think the Court prepared to extend the same constitutional
protection to sex selection that it did to abortion, and to adopt an undue
burden analysis in evaluating legislation restricting its use.
Neither, however, would the Court be likely to use "intermediate
scrutiny," which examines whether a law is "substantially related" to an
"important" governmental interest. Courts reserve intermediate scrutiny
to protect "quasi-suspect" classes of people, such as those treated
differently because of gender or illegitimacy.5 7 One could construct
an argument that quasi-suspect classes should be expanded to include
those discriminated against on the basis of offspring gender, because the
impact of legislation prohibiting sex selection falls disproportionally on
those preferring boys. But such an argument is at best attenuated.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., id. at 2807-08.
156. Id. at 2846.
157. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982). One could argue that sex selectors could
invoke intermediate scrutiny because the activity they seek to protect is about gender. Yet
this would diverge markedly from the line of cases protecting "quasi-suspect" classes,
because these classes the courts want to protect from discrimination, not protect from
interference with their own efforts to discriminate.
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Consequently, any court hearing a challenge to a law prohibiting sex
selection would almost certainly apply the familiar "minimum scrutiny"
analysis, asking whether the law was "rationally" related to a "legiti-
mate" state interest. 58 Such analysis asks, essentially, whether a law
is irrational or arbitrary. Despite the fact that any societal consequences
of sex selection are still largely speculative, they do seem at least
plausibly deleterious, and thus of "legitimate" concern. Prohibition need
not be the best approach, or even a sensible approach, to be rationally
related. Thus, a law prohibiting the use of sex-selection techniques would
probably be constitutional under minimum scrutiny, which offers a very
low threshold indeed.
While sex selection is not a fundamental right, at least under the
existing legal regime, common sense tells us that access to sex-selection
technology involves a liberty interest of some kind, even if such does not
formally rise to the level affording it legal protection. Although there
may be no legal right to own a car, there is obviously an important
liberty interest in being able to own a car if one chooses and can so
afford. While the courts have not frequently been called upon to
delineate between liberties that "cannot" be deprived and liberties that
"should not" be deprived, the common sense that legislators should bring
to bear upon their task indicates that such latter liberties do exist. While
they may not invoke the "intermediate scrutiny" of the courts in formal
fashion, legislators should nonetheless feel reluctant to restrict such
freedoms more than necessary to achieve important state goals.
For while the sex-selection liberty may not legitimately invoke the
same protection afforded the abortion liberty, because deprivation of the
latter is undeniably more intrusive than deprivation of the former, denying
sex selection is intrusive to some degree. 5 9 Before safe abortions, for
example, one would never have talked of "forcing" a woman to bring a'
child to term. Similarly, before practicable sex selection one would never
have spoken of forcing a woman to bear a male or female child, or of
forcing her to take a 50/50 chance of having a child of a certain gender,
instead of a 70/30 one. " But technology has now made such language
158. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); U.S.
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
159. While the denial of sex selection is less intrusive than that of abortion, so is the state
interest less significant. It would be difficult to argue that the state interest in maintaining
a given gender ratio rises to a level equal with the "substantial state interest in potential life
throughout pregnancy." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
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appropriate. If sex selection were prohibited, the state would essentially
be conscripting a woman's body into the service of maintaining a state-
preferred gender ratio. The inappropriateness of this would be more
manifest if the state later developed an interest in a different gender ratio.
While minimum scrutiny can satisfy the courts, it should not satisfy the
public. Reproductive matters, for example, from conception through
childrearing, are never completely frivolous. People frequently devote
a major part of their lives to raising a child and closely associate a sense
of fulfillment with both the process and intermittent results of that effort.
While simply having a preference does not make that preference non-
frivolous, having a strong gender preference-a preference firmly seated
in one's psychology and one's dreams for the future, a preference widely
shared-is almost by definition non-frivolous. This is particularly true
where, as in this context, the preferences reflect patterns of desires
discernable through thousands of years of history. While such may not
have ever inspired "traditional" protection, they are themselves, for better
or for worse, sufficiently traditional to rebut allegations of frivolity.
As neither a fundamental right nor a frivolous luxury, gender selection
deserves more careful attention than those arguing mere prohibition or
non-intervention have thus far afforded it. Different approaches to sex
selection may be legal though not sensible, and society should strive for
the latter before considering the former. Gender selection is a form of
behavior, of human activity, that should not be easily transgressed.
C. Assessing the Existing Approaches
By separating the absolutists from the consequentialists, by refining an
understanding of the types of sex-selection behavior that are really at
issue, and by taking stock of the relative nature and position of such
behavior in our society, one thing becomes apparent: Government need
not look only to prohibition or non-intervention as the sole strategies for
addressing sex selection.
1. The Prohibition Model
Consequentialists should reject the prohibition approach because
prohibition may have an undesired result. State intrusion into consumer
access to technology may inappropriately interfere with the pursuit of
happiness generally, and reproductive freedoms specifically. Each result
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is disturbing, particularly since each may serve as precedent for increased
government intervention.
Prohibition is overaggressive. It is logical to recognize, for example,
that the consequences of sex selection are not yet manifest. Nor are they,
in all probability, likely to accrue suddenly. As a temporal matter, then,
it is not obvious that the consequences of sex selection can only be
addressed effectively by immediate and aggressive governmental action.
Moreover, the magnitude of the problem, as it develops, is not likely to
be catastrophic in the first instance. While it may be technology-
facilitated, sex selection need invoke no fears similar to those regarding
self-replicating, genetically engineered organisms. The magnitude of the
problem is apt to be considerably lessened, as well, by the rapid rise of
the feminist movement, which will increase resistance to unabashed male-
preference.
Moreover, the emerging laws prohibiting sex selection, most concerned
for the moment with the postconceptive context, do little to allay the fear
that government will overreach. Whether providing for criminal
punishment, civil damages, or both, these statutes are ill-designed and
inappropriate for several reasons: they are harbingers of more expansive
restrictions, and they foreshadow equally inappropriate laws for other sex-
selection contexts.
The laws are, for example, remarkably unsophisticated: None
provides any guidance as to enforcement, although any serious reflection
indicates that enforcement problems are numerous. The laws, in fact, are
almost as difficult to enforce as prohibitions on the use of contraceptives
or the practice of sodomy.
The existing statutes designed to prohibit sex-selection abortion, in
Illinois and Pennsylvania, as well as those proposed statutes in other
states, each exclude from the category of allowable abortions any sought
"solely" on account of the sex of the fetus." The "sole-purpose"
requirement is unworkable, as much for its assumption that an action ever
has a single purpose, as for its expectation that such could be divined,
even were it to exist, from mothers or couples who have an interest in
obscuring their motivations from the prohibiting state.
The laws passed or proposed typically prohibit any abortion that the
performer knows is being requested solely for sex-selection purposes.'"
160. See supra note 78.
161. See Illinois Abortion Law, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26, § 6(8) (Smith-Hurd
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Proving "knowledge" in the context of a doctor-patient relationship, when
the patient truly wants the prohibited result, is not only difficult, but
unlikely. The Pennsylvania statute is even more expansive, extending
criminality to such abortions performed "intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly."" The "intentionally" and "recklessly" criteria are both
vague in this context. How does one "recklessly" perform an abortion
sought solely on the basis of gender if that fact is unknown? Does
avoiding recklessness create an explicit or functional burden on those
performing abortion to "inquire" of a woman's motivations? To inquire
in a fashion "reasonably likely to uncover" a woman's motivations? The
statutes leave this unspecified.
In addition, the penalties for statute violation are oddly skewed.
Anyone performing an abortion in violation of the Illinois and Pennsylva-
nia laws commits a class A misdemeanor or felony of the third degree,
respectively.'" Should the guilty party be a licensed physician, she
may also lose her license."° In two bills, the woman upon whom an
illegal sex-selection abortion was performed, as well as the father of the
unborn child, may sue the person who performed the abortion in a civil
suit for a multiple of damages sustained, and up to ten-thousand dollars
in punitive damages.'" This creates the absurd result that a woman may
be able to receive a great deal of money, post-abortion, if she can
credibly assert that the performer knew she wanted to abort the fetus
because of its sex. Although the state allegedly wants to punish and deter
sex selection, this scheme is analogous to outlawing the sale of illicit
drugs, but not the purchase or use of drugs.
Supp. 1990) (class A misdemeanor; possible license suspension or revocation); Abortion
Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3204(c) (Supp. 1990) ("unprofessional conduct;"
possible license suspensionor revocation). As examples of proposed legislation with similar
provisions, see Conn. H.R. 5448, Reg. Sess. (1990) ($10,000 punitive damages plus treble
actual damages); Ind. H.R. 1088, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. (1990) (class C felony); Md. S. 834,
396th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1990) ($1000 damages, plus up to $5000 fine, and 5 years
imprisonment); Md. H.R. 1416, 396th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1990) (same); R.I. S. 2232, Jan.
Sess. (1990) (S10,000 punitive damages plus treble actual damages); Tex. S. 421, 71st Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (1989) (third degree felony); Tex. H.R. 906, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989)
(same).
162. Abortion Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3204(c) (Supp. 1990).
163. Illinois Abortion Law, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26 § 6(8) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990); Abortion Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3104(c) (Supp. 1990).
164. Illinois Abortion Law, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26 § 6(8) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990); Abortion Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3104(c) (Supp. 1990).
165. Conn. H.R. 5448, Reg. Sess. (1990); R.I. S. 2232, Jan. Sess. (1990). A bill
introduced in California even gives a grandparent of the aborted child a cause of action.
Cal. S. 1232 (1991).
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Allowing a civil suit against the doctor seems to encourage, rather than
discourage, requests for sex-selection abortion. If the drug laws allowed
a user to recover punitive damages from the supplier, with complete
impunity, the rational actor may go looking to buy drugs. Perhaps this
may be a cost-effective way of identifying and prosecuting drug suppliers.
Yet it is questionable whether such overzealous encouragement for
patients to turn against their doctors, who perform many legal and life-
improving functions, would yield a net good. Indeed, there is a financial
incentive for any abortion patient to wage a low-risk/high-return battle of
credibility against the doctor, conveniently subsidized by the plaintiff's
bar. This may deter doctors from performing the otherwise legal
abortion function, or make insurance premiums ever more prohibitive.
The gravity of the penalties and the uncertain contours of the crimes
as defined may prompt many to refuse to perform abortions for these
reasons alone. This chilling effect might have dramatic repercussions for
those seeking legal abortions. This result, unrelated to the alleged
purpose of the laws, exposes their unfitness. Moreover, punishing
someone for performing an act that is otherwise legal simply because it
is requested for an illegal reason seems misplaced; it puts all the risk
upon the performer, instead of the requestor, and renders questionable
whether such side effects were responsibly considered." s
2. The Non-Intervention Model
Consequentialists should eschew the non-intervention approach because
non-intervention could lead to social disruption and economic inefficiency.
If sex selection were to become truly widespread (as assumed earlier for
the purpose of analysis) it could dramatically alter gender proportions and
profoundly affect our culture. Since sex preferences are both prevalent
and non-random, sex selection is possible, and advances in technology
make it ever more so, then if behavior correlates strongly with preferenc-
es, significant demographic and behavioral changes could ensue that may
lead to diverse and significant cultural distortions. Consequently, a non-
intervention approach might produce the need for more expensive
remedies than the foregone preventions. Enormous expenditures of
capital and energy would be necessary to protect minimum economic,
166. Indeed, since the prohibitions as written so obviously create a chilling effect on
otherwise legal abortions, it is not so unreasonable to ask whether they may have been
intended to do so.
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political, and cultural stability. Non-intervention could generate more
problems than it avoids. This inefficiency, if sustained by government
policy, would result in the imposition of great costs to parties entirely
unrelated to the sex-selection issue. The effects of non-intervention could
ultimately require government intrusion to ameliorate matters at a time
when the cure would be more dramatic than the prevention.
There are several troubling aspects, in particular, of the Doctors
Dissuade approach, in which doctors attempt to convince one seeking sex-
selection procedures not to employ the available technology. Admittedly,
lawyers and doctors operate in entirely different social and professional
arenas, often inflating their roles in society and incorrectly assuming that
they are not only the proper repositories of society's values, but also the
most appropriate group to give these values form. Each group is
chronically suspicious of the other. Yet there are at least four reasons
why sex selection should not be left to doctors alone.
First, it is nothing less than an ambush to hold oneself out as a doctor
who may facilitate sex selection, all the while intending to conduct an
opportunistic campaign of dissuasion upon the unwary." True, doctors
are not mechanics, and should provide information necessary for a patient
to effect an appropriate decision. Yet there is a significant difference
between informing and discouraging. This is particularly true where
doctors are motivated not by potential harm to the patient in their care,
but by the perception of speculative harms to society, or even by their
own morality. In such a circumstance, doctors abuse their positions of
trust, and practice ministry, not medicine."e
Second, the suggestion that doctors should intentionally withhold
information from a patient encourages a degree of paternalism unaccept-
able to, although perhaps unanticipated by, the patient herself."
167. This has arisen in the abortion context where pro-life doctors have attempted to
persuade women patients not to have an abortion in order to save the fetus, inspiring an
ethical debate over whether pro-life doctors have a duty to inform patients of the doctors'
position.
168. Note that a doctor need not practice unethically in order to avoid dispensing ethics;
she may simply and openly refuse to facilitate sex-selection procedures, or, for example,
sex-selection procedures unrelated to gender-linked disease. People expect to adopt or
confront the influence of obviously pressure-generating social structures such as church and
family, whose power over them, if any, is more moral than tangible. Yet people do not
expect doctors to exert such influence; they may not recognize it, and may be unfairly
disadvantaged by a quiet ambush that is decisively tangible. By manipulating information
provided, and by standing in a position directly and immediately to assist or impede access
to necessary technology, doctors gain an unfair and inappropriate power over a citizen
pursuing a legal activity.
169. See generally JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 50-51
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Whether one views this from a legal perspective (breach of contract or of
fiduciary duty), or an economic perspective (hiding information about the
quality of services creates inefficiencies in the market), it is clearly
inappropriate.
Third, the medical profession is intensely male-dominated. An issue
that so fundamentally affects women should not be subjected to invisible
decisionmaking by an excessively gender-skewed organization. While
legislatures, certainly, may be equally male-dominated, at least their
decisions are susceptible to democratic critique and pressure from
women.
170
With respect to the Social Exhortation approach, which advocates
informal but widespread criticism of sex selection, it is entirely obvious
that it can coexist with any other approach whatsoever. Social mecha-
nisms are often more appropriate than legal ones for addressing underly-
ing prejudices. One cannot, for example, force people to love their
children equally, despite the fact that it might be preferable if they did.
One cannot successfully legislate desires, or repress them through
prohibitions.
V. PROPOSALS: REGULATION FOR
CONSEQUENTIALISTS
Any conflict between consequentialist prohibitionists and consequential-
ist noninterventionists is more artificial than real. Their debate over the
magnitude of sex selection's consequences, and whether these dictate that
sex selection should or should not be prohibited, ignores important
alternatives.
(1974) (superior technical knowledge, sometimes leading to feelings of moral superiority,
may tempt doctors to treat adult patients like children).
170. Viewed from this perspective, the Doctors Dissuade approach also appears
inconsistent with principles of representative self-government. Doctors do not comprise a
representative body, and policy decisions operating on the level of individual childbearing
should not be determined and implemented by individuals who are not accountable to the
general public. While no one will argue that legislatures or executive agencies are perfectly
representative, it is hard to argue that they are not more representative than the American
Medical Association. True, legislators may sport inferior understandingof certain principles
of the technology, and their studies and subsequent regulation may lag significantly behind
advancing science. Yet their decisionmaking processes are more open, at least affording
the opportunity for community input and criticism. It is ironic that while many of the
proponents of the Doctors Dissuade approach prefer to keep the law away from sex
selection, for the precise reason that this would restrict female freedom, they argue that
doctors are in the best position to decide how a woman may use her body.
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No consequences will occur, obviously, unless people actually practice
sex selection. Many assume that whether people will do so depends
solely on the existence of sex-selection procedures and gender preferenc-
es. It does not. In fact, it is precisely this superficial reasoning, which
characterizes the decision to select sex as merely binary, that has
restricted the policy debates to the similarly mischaracterized "binary"
choice of whether government should entirely prohibit or passively allow
sex selection.
Individuals have gender preferences of varying strengths, and the
choice of whether or not to sex-select depends upon a woman's unique
balancing of perceived private benefits and private costs, as well as other
considerations. Any appropriate governmental action should be sensitive
to the complexity of this decisionmaking process.
A. Proposals for Legislative Action
Legislatures should establish sex-selection policy. Following is a
suggested approach.
171
First: Slow Down. A legislature should not rush to prohibit sex
selection without further public discussion that clearly separates both the
absolutist views from the consequentialist perspectives, and the postcon-
ceptive context from the preconceptive context. The absolutist-prohibi-
tionists will be satisfied with nothing short of prohibition, while the
absolutist-non-interventionists will be satisfied with nothing short of
laissez-faire. Legislators would be unwise to attempt appropriate
legislative strategies without attempting to assess the size of these two
constituencies. While either of the absolutist positions may be vindicated
in the future, at the moment they appear to command insufficient numbers
to warrant an aggressive posture entirely curtailing liberty interests or
entirely ignoring valid governmental concerns about a potentially harmful
activity. In the meantime, legislators should turn their skills toward
recognizing and reconciling the consequentialist perspectives.
Second: Monitor. It makes little sense to worry about dire conse-
quences without a more accurate sense of where we are on the timeline
of doom. That is not to say that we must be visited by disaster before
171. It has traditionally been left to the states to control familial relations (such as
marriage, divorce, and adoption) and health care. Nevertheless, these matters are
increasingly becoming federalized, to implement a comprehensive national policy, and the
suggestions here discussed are appropriate at either the state or federal level.
Fall, 1992]
HeinOnline  -- 6 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 49 1992-1993
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
being convinced of its imminence, nor that we should not prepare for the
contingency of its visitation. As an initial matter, a legislature should
establish a simple mechanism for monitoring gender ratio shifts. A shift
would be probative of the existence and extent of sex selection, and might
suggest when government involvement is advisable. A lack of a shift
would indicate either that sex selection is rarely employed, or that gender
preferences are offsetting each other. In either case, government
involvement to alleviate consequentialist concerns would be largely
unnecessary.
One such mechanism already exists at the federal level: The National
Institutes of Health maintain national natality statistics. A more active
form of monitoring might require facilities offering preconceptive sex-
selection procedures to report their efforts and successes, as well as basic
demographic information on the requestors, to a centralized databank.
Such a monitoring mechanism has been proposed for the collection of
medical and genetic histories of sperm donors,"t and a similar over-
sight effort requires the monitoring of silicone breast implants."n The
Supreme Court's Casey decision makes it clear that such recordkeeping
and reporting requirements are constitutional. 74
Third: Set a Threshold. While passively monitoring domestic sex-
selection behavior, government should establish a commission to set a
threshold level of gender ratio skew, beneath which they simply would
not intervene. A ratio threshold is preferable to a threshold establishing
absolute numerical limits on procedures selecting for males or females
because the consequentialists opposing sex selection are principally
concerned with the societal effects of the practice, and the "magnitude"
of these effects is necessarily relative. 75 Considering the total number
of births in our society, there must be some number of sex-selection
births that the government would deem negligible.
The agency must decide the relevant population segment to which this
ratio threshold would apply. It might choose, for example, to measure
only the skew in the gender ratio of the entire population, of the child-
bearing-age population, or of infants. If the state should want to establish
172. BLANK, supra note 68, at 139.
173. See, e.g., Marian Segal, Silicone Breast Implants: Available Under ight Controls,
FDA CONSUMER, June 1992, at 6.
174. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2844 (1992).
175. If the converse obtained, then the magnitude of the principal effects would fluctuate
as arbitrarily determined by population size.
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a ratio sensitive to all of these factors, but recognizes that they may vary
in relative importance, it could set different thresholds for each segment,
weight each accordingly, and reduce them formulaically to an approxi-
mate ratio that would be used in implementing policy initiatives.
Fourth: Consider Regulatory Alternatives. Theorists assert that
regulation, which necessarily interferes with the free market, is justifiable
in extenuating circumstances, such as when monopoly conditions,
"excess" profits, inadequate information, or "externalities" are pres-
ent. 7 6 Sex selection involves the problem of externalities.
Should the threshold established by the previously contemplated
commission be approached or transgressed, governmental policymakers
should consider methods of regulation that would keep sex selection
within acceptable quantitative limits. All the usual regulatory tools are
available, in a bewildering, but rich, array of possibilities.
Government could, for example, reduce or eliminate any public
funding of projects for discovering and improving sex-selection proce-
dures. It could establish rigorous licensing procedures of facilities or
practitioners. These procedures, quite intentionally, could limit entry into
the field by establishing high minimum qualifications, or even high
licensing fees.
Alternatively, government could issue a limited number of permits for
sex selection, available either to doctors or to prospective parents. Such
permits could be provided by lottery, for a flat or sliding fee, or even by
auction. They could reduce deleterious effects of sex selection by
limiting the aggregate number of attempts at sex selection or the
aggregate number of births following sex selection. Moreover, permits
specific for each gender might also be issued, enabling government
control over both the number of sex selections and the gender ratio
thereby produced. These could be limited to either one per woman, or
to contexts in which parents want to balance the family gender ratio."7
All these methods, of course, are designed to limit the supply of sex-
selection procedures. There are also many ways to limit the demand for
sex selection. A special form of regulatory tax, for example, may be
176. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982) (overview of
justifications for regulation).
177. Id. at 261-84. Other regulatory mechanisms include cost-of-service ratemaking,
historically based price regulation, allocation under a public interest standard, standard
setting, historically based allocation, individualized screening, and a host of alternatives to
these classical regulation schemes.
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effective in reducing demand, especially if the proceeds were used both
to combat the very prejudices driving the demand, and to mitigate the
harm incident thereto. This idea is worth examination in more depth,
because it serves to demonstrate how methods can exist to reconcile and
manage consequentialist concerns.
B. A Simple Example: A Countercycle Earmarked Excise Tax ("CEET")
This Section explores, as one regulatory alternative to prohibition or
non-intervention, a tax scheme herein referred to as "Countercycle
Earmarked Excise Tax" ("CEET"). As explained in greater detail below,
CEET can accomplish four things, corresponding to the existing demand,
the causes of the demand, the results of that demand, and changes in
demand.
First, it can reduce the demand for sex-selection procedures by driving
up the costs with an excise tax. Second, it can further reduce demand by
earmarking these excise tax revenues and "countercycling" them into
programs designed to decrease the desire for sex selection. Third, CEET
can use these revenues to counteract, to some extent, harms attendant to
widespread sex selection. 7  Fourth, it monitors the extent of sex
selection, because revenues are generated in direct proportion to its
incidence.
CEET thus simultaneously alleviates the concerns of the consequential-
ist opposition to sex selection without dramatically restricting the liberties
of those seeking sex selection or fighting government intrusiveness. It
seeks that delicate balance of societal and individual interests.
To administer this strategy, a legislature would need to enact a CEET
and either create an overseeing agency or include such oversight within
the responsibilities of an existing agency.
178. The term "counter"-cycling is used here to distinguish this concept from "re"-
cycling, in which a product or revenue is returned to the stream of commerce in furtherance
of the activity from which it came. Countercycling, in contrast, uses an activity's own
product or revenue against it.
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1. Overview of CEET
a. Decreasing the Demand: Part One
Consider the cost/benefit analysis of a potential sex selector. The
benefits were earlier discussed, as were the costs, which included, among
other things, purchasing the necessary technology and services, the time
involved (particularly if repeated attempts at sex selection are necessary),
and the "psychic" costs of overcoming any residual guilt about preferring
one gender over the other.
The benefits and costs suggest that if the strength of the gender
preference is greater than the costs to the individual mother or couple (the
"private" costs) of a given sex-selection technique, then sex selection may
be attempted. The consequences that will befall others (the "social"
costs) as a result of that action will not enter directly into the calculus of
the mother or couple. Since neither provider nor consumer pay these
costs, the demand for sex selection is greater than if consumers them-
selves had to bear the full cost of the adverse side effects. Driving up the
cost of sex selection with an excise tax would, in part, force sex selectors
to "internalize" some of these externalities, and reduce the demand.'79
Left alone, market forces would typically yield an equilibrium of
supply and demand of sex-selection procedures. A tax increases the price
above the equilibrium price. The number of consumers willing to pay
this increased price then decreases (by "retreating," in economic terms,
along the demand curve). This decrease is due, in part, to the variance
between would-be sex-selectors in strength of desires and personal wealth.
179. The rate of decrease, and the extent to which the effective payment of the tax is
divided between the supplier and the consumer, depends in large part on the elasticity of the
demand curves. The increased cost to actors, however, is not necessarily equivalent to the
actual cost to society. First, these costs may be impossible to quantify accurately. Second,
the activity may be sufficiently beneficial to the economy, for instance, that governmentwill
choose to spread part of the cost of that activity among society. The size of the government-
imposed tax, then, reflects a policy about the acceptable quantitative or qualitative
occurrence of that activity. Cf. Gardner M. Brown, Jr. & Ralph W. Johnson, Pollution
Control By Effluent Charges: It Works in the Federal Republic of Germany, Why Not in the
U.S.?, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 929 (1984). Note that the tax attempts to approximate
bargaining between parties that would occur in the absence of transaction costs. Whether
the sex selectors pay to select, or society pays them not to, depends upon whether liability
rights or property rights attach. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1089 (1972). The tax is also decisively different from a fine, as the latter is
intended to deter and punish in the manner of criminal sanctions.
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Assume, for example, that no tax is currently imposed. Those who value
the increased chance of having a child of the desired gender equal to or
higher than the aggregate costs they will incur will sex-select.
If a non-exorbitant tax of a certain amount is added to the costs of sex
selection, however, those whose personal calculation ascribed to sex
selection a value equal to or barely exceeding the pre-tax cost will choose
not to sex-select. It follows, then, that those who will choose to sex-
select in spite of the tax personally "value" sex selection more highly than
those who forsake sex selection. In sum, this ability to purchase sex
selection, even if it is more expensive, protects the liberty interest of
those who value sex selection most highly.'O
b. Decreasing the Demand: Part Two
CEET can be used to reduce demand further by earmarking the tax
revenues to "boomerang," that is, to combat the parental perceptions that
lead to gender preferences in the first place.15" This could involve
information campaigns combatting sex stereotyping as well as public
education and negative publicity about possible adverse consequences. in
It might consist of positive publicity about the desirability of girls, or
about the difficulties of raising boys."s (Such efforts, of course, would
have to be considered carefully, since they assume gender-linked
differences, one of the assumptions many may seek to overcome.)
Finally, the CEET revenues could be used to increase its own effective-
ness, by funding research into how to target information to potential sex
selectors.
In any event, the CEET yields revenues that can be used to decrease
the demand even further, beyond the decrease attributable to the increased
price itself. This means that even fewer sex selections would be sought
and performed than would obtain if revenues from the tax were used for
180. The possibility that discrepancies in wealth will unfairly skew this result is explored
below in Section B.3.
181. While the terms "countercycling" and "boomerang" may be cumbersome,
alternatives frequently seem more so. For example, "I'd call it a Super Double Whammy
Tax." Interview with Joseph Tsai, Tax Attorney, Sullivan& Cromwell, Washington, D.C.
(June 14, 1992).
182. A California anti-smoking campaign, for example, which was funded in part by a
tax on cigarettes, reduced the percentage of Californian smokers by 17% in three years.
And-Smoldng Effort Working, Study Finds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1992, at BI.
183. See, e.g., BILL WATTERSON, CALVIN AND HOBBES: ATTACK OF THE DERANGED
MUTANT KILLER MONSTER SNOW GOONS 1 (1990).
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other purposes.
By counteracting in some measure the desire to sex-select, tax revenues
reduce the quantity of purchased sex-selection procedures even further.
(In economic terms, the demand curve shifts to the left.) Reducing the
number of people desiring sex selection results in a corresponding
reduction in sex-selection procedures actually performed.
c. Mitigating the Harm
Some of the CEET revenues can be countercycled to counteract some
of the harm that sex selection may produce."s These efforts should
concentrate on a societal rather than individual level because: (1) causa-
tion would be difficult to trace for individuals, but can be more readily
inferred for large groups;" (2) the magnitude of the harm to an
individual would be difficult to measure, given the multitude of possible
reasons for most symptoms of the harm; and (3) injury is likely to be
spread across society to a group so large that identifying a class of
claimants may waste better-used resources, assuming that all persons are
affected in some way.
Legislatures would have to explore carefully possible programs
designed to mitigate the externalities, since some of these might reinforce
existing stereotypes. Some of the programs to consider would be
government-funded scholarships for girls and women, government-
sponsored psychology studies about (and resultant strategies to combat)
second-child syndrome, bolstered affirmative action hiring require-
ments,15 6 and special job-training and leadership programs for girls and
women. A parental-education program, too, could be very useful if it
encouraged parents who did have girls to raise them to possess precisely
the qualities for which the parents wanted a boy. Finally, the most
extreme possibility would involve government actually creating financial
184. In California, for example, revenues from a special tax on cigarettes (25 cents per
pack) are used, in part, to fund cancer care and research, as well as to fund local health
departments and community groups involved in tobacco control. See George F. Will,
Tobacco Road, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1992, at C7.
185. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (individual plaintiff investor, when
demonstrating injury, is entitled under the "fraud-on-the-market" theory to rebuttable
presumption of reliance on defendant corporation's material misstatements, since these
almost inevitably affect the market price of defendant's stock).
186. This could take the form, for example, of offsetting certain tax breaks for complying
organizations. The implications of this alone could yield a separate article.
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incentives to bear females, thus compensating for increased male
births.187 This could involve subsidies to encourage those women
currently carrying a female fetus and seeking an abortion, whether for
sex-selection reasons or not, to carry the fetus to term. 18s
Examining some of these logical, possible uses of CEET revenue is no
guide to discovering the advisable ones. The question would immediately
arise: On what basis could the government decide to allocate revenues?
Revenue allocation would need to address both the method and the
amount of funding. Obviously, choosing appropriate methods would
require feasibility determinations, which depend on the total funding
available. Similarly, determining appropriate funding amounts will
depend on judgments about the suitability of the method to the long-range
goal of decreasing demand. This depends in turn on assessments of how
many individuals are harmed by sex selection (quantitative analysis), and
in what relative magnitudes (qualitative analysis). Quantitative analysis,
for example, might examine whether more people are harmed by sex
discrimination in the fifty-and-over age group than those in the thirty-and-
under group. Qualitative analysis might examine whether the psychologi-
cal harm of belonging to the disfavored gender is greater for a ten-year-
old than for a thirty-year-old.
No algebraic formula can determine the optimal influence of quantita-
tive and qualitative conclusions, and a government's strategic decisions
are inherently fact-bound. Yet this makes policymaking for sex selection
no different than that for other more usual, complex social problems.
d. Monitoring Use
One significant advantage of CEET is that it generates revenues at the
same time it monitors the potential problems. This distinguishes it from
a government or grant-funded study of the problems. For example, if a
study concludes that there is no problem, it has used resources arguably
better spent elsewhere; if the study concludes that a problem exists, it has
187. But see Tamar Frankel & Francis H. Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory
to Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 99 (1987) (commenting on the commingling issues of
children and finances, as best elaborated in William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), and Richard Posner,
Adoption and Market Theory: The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV.
59 (1987)).
188. The payments may be sufficient for the mother to choose to carry the baby to term,
even if she were planning to give it up for adoption.
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generated information but nothing else. With CEET, on the other hand,
the tax revenues themselves both provide information on use and
simultaneously generate revenues in rough proportion to the potential
magnitude of adverse consequences. If the tax effectively reaches actual
sex-selection procedures, then low revenues means low use. The
consequentialist-prohibitionist's concerns would be disproved, and
prohibition on that basis would be de facto untenable. If the revenues
indicate that sex selection is widely used, or increasing over time, the tax
measures thus increase with increased funds to address it.
Significantly, this ultimately puts the intrusive power of the govern-
ment in lock-step with the ebb and flow of sex-selection use. It also
ensures that the parties responsible for contributing to any consequences
are contributing to alleviation of those consequences.
2. The Object and Amount of the Tax
For the tax to work, the government agency must specify both the
object and the amount of the tax. Specifying the object determines the
comprehensiveness of the regulation, while specifying the amount
determines how frequently sex selection is practiced.
The tax revenues must closely reflect the actual incidence of sex
selection. Obviously, the tax may attach to procedures, products, or a
combination of these. Taxation of procedures might, for example, target
each use of the various sperm-separation techniques, or even amniocente-
ses that were not medically indicated. 9 Considering possible alterna-
tives, a legislature might choose to tax abortions of fetuses (or perhaps
just female fetuses), that follow the conveyance of gender informa-
tion."3 Taxation of products might attach to either those available
someday to consumers directly, or to those nonreusable products,
chemicals, or components used for each sex-selection procedure.
While the government seeks to maintain a gender ratio beneath the
threshold earlier established, it cannot control that ratio directly. Rather,
it must attend to the use of sex-selection procedures. To determine the
amount of the tax, therefore, the agency must set an approximate "range"
189. While the latter adds a subjective element less verifiable for purposes of enforce-
ment, a statutorily mandated doctor's certificate's of medical necessity might reduce the
incidence of evasion, were it a problem.
190. Of course, measures dependent on information transmittal are susceptible to evasion
to the same extent as is "knowledge"-dependentcriminalization, but certainly no more so.
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of the acceptable incidence of sex-selection behavior that would keep the
gender ratio skew beneath the threshold level. Because not every attempt
at sex selection is successful, and not every successful sex selection
differs from what would have occurred naturally, the agency, over time,
must monitor the actual volume of sex-selection procedures (from
revenues) and adjust the amount of the tax to ensure that it falls within
the target "range."
The objects and amounts of the tax, as well as the range itself, should
be reviewed periodically. Since the interaction of these variables will
affect sex-selection behavior and the extent of its externalities, the
government must adapt the regulation to adjust to cumulating information
on the existence of harms that have historically been speculative, and
changing patterns of actual use. 191
Actual use will depend, in part, on the marketable technology.
Variations in technology will challenge the agency in important respects.
For example, the more dramatic of the possible consequences of efforts
to sex-select only arise if those efforts are successful. Should the tax
apply to only sex-selection efforts that are successful? If so, this may
create an unduly burdensome problem of information-gathering,
particularly for "at-home" sex-selection procedures. If not, the govern-
ment would need to estimate success rates. This would require special
attention to the variations in success rates among procedures. There is,
for instance, a current discrepancy in success rates between preconception
and postconception procedures, and between procedures for selecting a
male or female."9
The effects of preconception procedures are also substantively different
than postconception ones. While each postconception procedure is
intended ultimately to substitute a child of one gender for a child of the
other, preconception techniques have only half that effect. Because a
child of the desired sex might have been conceived without sex selection,
the preconception sex-selection procedure only alters the gender outcome
at most fifty percent at the time."9 Thus the government could easily
allow twice as many preconception as postconception techniques if
attempting to establish limits based on equivalent effects.
191. It would make little sense, for instance, to have a large tax on sex-selection medical
procedures if the inevitable sex-selection products were disproportionally preferred by
consumers, and yet lesser-taxed.
192. With respect to the latter, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
193. No commentator, it appears, has highlighted this significant distinction.
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3. Possible Legal Objections to the CEET as Applied
Some might argue that the CEET would not survive an equal protec-
tion analysis: It discriminates against the poor by mandating unequal
access to a technology that allows control over fundamental and protec-
table procreative liberties."9 True, a person's assessment of her ability
to pay for sex-selection procedures will include a practical assessment of
those procedures as a percentage of her assets. The cost of the procedure
may, therefore, affect her financial condition more dramatically than it
would that of a wealthier person.
Also, because affluence will affect the relative magnitude of the
personal costs of purchasing sex selection, the rich could thus actualize
a weak gender preference more easily than could the poor a stronger
preference. This might result in a disproportionate number of males born
to rich families, thus altering the sex composition of the upper class and
further exacerbating the problem of female disempowerment.
This reasoning fails to demonstrate unconstitutionality, however, even
if it is otherwise accurate in its assessment. Wealth classifications do not
ordinarily violate equal protection. The Supreme Court has, over the
years, constructed doctrines to distinguish equal protection contexts
requiring strict judicial scrutiny from those warranting deference.
Admittedly, de facto effects may raise suspicions as easily as explicit
classifications. Such suspicions prompted the Warren Court to sructinize
strictly legislation involving either suspect classifications, or an impact on
fundamental rights or interests." s
Yet that Court only hinted that things such as de jure or de facto
wealth classifications might be suspect"9 (and, of course, left "funda-
mental rights or interests" unenumerated and undefined). Subsequent
doctrinal evolution during the Burger Court years made clear that wealth
194. Some have argued that such a distinction will only reinforce the subordinate status
of women. See, e.g., Steinbacher, supra note 45, at 188.
195. During the pre-Warren years, the Court employed "old" equal protection analysis
by focusing on the "means" used by a legislature, and generally deferring to that branch.
That is, the government could not impose differences in treatment without "some reasonable
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation." Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). During the Warren years the Court developed a two-tier
approach to equal protection, focusing on the "ends" of legislation, as well as on the
"means." Means had to be "necessary," not merely "reasonably related;" ends had to be
"compelling," not merely "legitimate" state interests. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
196. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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classifications, or the mere result of disadvantageous impact on the less
wealthy, alone are insufficient to invoke strict scrutiny.1" Indeed,
wealth cannot typically be a suspect classification in a society by and
large committed to a market-pricing system."re
Thus, the fact that the poor may have unequal access to regulated sex-
selection technology does not seem sufficient to make such regulation
unconstitutional absent a showing that such technology enables a citizen
to exercise a fundamental right. Such a showing cannot be made, as
explained earlier."9
Professor Michelman has recognized that even in a market economy
people are entitled to "minimum protection" against severe economic
deprivations in certain areas. He suggests that one can test these for
"intolerableness" by asking which would be consensually deemed
unacceptable in a "just society."' Upon employing this test, however,
it is difficult not to conclude that differential access to sex-selection
technology would be acceptable, and consequently constitutional.
It is true that newly developed technology can create strong psychologi-
cal needs for things previously considered unattainable." 1 Access to
infertility treatment is a perfect example; it is more distressing to be
infertile in an age of infertility treatments yet unable to bear their costs
than it is to be infertile in an age when no treatment exists. One can
argue, therefore, that needs change as a function of emotional develop-
ment, which in turn is a function of perceptions of the available and the
possible. If that were the case, a deep-felt and sincere emotional need to
have a child of a given gender could be left unmet.
Nevertheless, sex-selection technology is distinguishablefrom infertility
treatment, and a disembodied populous behind a veil of ignorance would
probably so agree. There is a tremendous difference between asserting
a fundamental right to procreate at all and asserting a similar right to
procreate as one wishes, that is, to have a child of the gender one prefers.
197. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); see also Gerald Gunther,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 9, §§ 1, 3 (11th ed. 1985).
198. See Frank I. Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the XIV
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1986).
199. See Part 1V.B.
200. Michelman, supra note 198, at 7; cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973).
201. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986); Kevin MeKean, Decisions, Decisions, DIScOvER, June
1985, at 22 (each discussing how varying extrinsic factors often create differing subjective
perceptions of the magnitude of a loss, even when the magnitude remains constant).
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The first assertion concerns the very existence of a child, the second
concerns mere manipulation of one characteristic of that child, namely its
gender.
The manipulation of this characteristic of a child with money, which
necessarily allows less opportunity for the poor similarly to control, is not
very different from similar situations that currently obtain in which no
equal protection argument is proffered. Wealthy parents, for example,
can more easily and dramatically influence both the quality, extent, status,
and exclusivity of their children's education than can poor parents. This
control over education, then, typically is simply an unobjectionable
opportunity to influence a characteristic or manifestation of a child with
money. The use of sex-selection technology seems not to differ in any
significant way: The emphasis is still one of the characteristics and not
of the existence of the child.
Moreover, while limiting access to sex selection, in part, by raising
prices may appear unfair, it is relatively less so than doing so for other
goods. For example, inability to afford sex selection cannot present an
actionable cause for alarm or subsidy when more tangibly important items
such as homes, jobs, and even nutritious food remain unaffordable to
many. In fact, states routinely employ a regressive tax on food.2' 2
Thus, a regulatory mechanism such as the CEET is one constitutional
tool available for decreasing the demand for, and consequences of, sex
selection without jeopardizing the liberty to sex-select.
CONCLUSION
Gender preferences have spanned centuries, continents, and cultures.
Reasonable people may differ on whether selecting the gender of a child
is inhuman, as a barbaric act of discrimination and as a usurpation of
God's intent, or quintessentially human, as an extension of mind and will
over nature and as a technology-facilitated enhancer of happiness.
Regardless, advances in the enabling technology, demonstrated and strong
gender preferences, increasingly tolerant attitudes toward sex selection,
and sharply polarizing views on the subject indicate that the controversial
issue should be addressed promptly, fairly, and squarely.
Advocates of the existing approaches, prohibitionand non-intervention,
have failed to differentiate between postconceptive and preconceptive
202. A progressive tax is sensitive to differences in wealth.
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contexts, and between absolutist and consequentialist arguments. These
are the operative distinctions. So differentiating makes evident that the
consequentialists, however split on sex selection, can agree on regulatory
strategies sensitive to the concerns of each, preventing social dislocation
without unnecessarily infringing upon reproductive liberties. The
Countercycle Earmarked Excise Tax, which decreases demand in two
separate ways and provides revenue to mitigate harmful consequences of
sex selection, is but one example of many such regulatory strategies that
creative legislators might design.
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